Delhi High Court Reduces 25-Year POCSO Sentence to 10 Years; Upholds Conviction of Accused in Sexual Assault of Minor Boy
Child Victim’s Consistent Testimony Sufficient to Sustain Conviction Despite Discrepancies in Disclosure, Place of Occurrence and Medical Evidence: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Dilip Kumar @ Tinu v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Case Number: CRL.A. 699/2024 & CRL.M.(BAIL) 1089/2026
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Madhu Jain
Date of Decision: 06 November 2026
Citation: CRL.A. 699/2024
FIR: No. 88/2019, Police Station Kotla Mubarakpur, Delhi
Relevant Provisions: Sections 377 and 506 IPC; Sections 5(l), 5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act; Section 29 of the POCSO Act.
Introduction
The Delhi High Court, in a significant judgment concerning the evidentiary value of a child victim’s testimony in cases involving sexual offences, has upheld the conviction of Dilip Kumar @ Tinu for aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon a minor boy while substantially reducing his sentence from 25 years to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.
Justice Madhu Jain, while deciding the criminal appeal, reiterated that the testimony of a child victim, if trustworthy, consistent on material particulars and found reliable after careful scrutiny, can independently form the basis of conviction without mandatory corroboration.
The Court further clarified that discrepancies relating to the precise date of occurrence, the exact place of incident, the sequence of disclosure and the absence of medical injuries cannot automatically undermine the prosecution case when the substantive testimony of the child remains credible.
At the same time, the judgment examined the applicability of the enhanced punishment introduced by the 2019 amendment to the POCSO Act and held that the sentence must be governed by the law applicable on the date of commission of the offence.
Facts of the Case
The prosecution case originated from FIR No. 88/2019 registered at Police Station Kotla Mubarakpur, Delhi, under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
According to the prosecution, the appellant had subjected a minor boy, approximately eight years of age, to penetrative sexual assault on two occasions at Rishi Nagar, Delhi. The incidents allegedly occurred in February 2019, approximately eight days apart.
The child alleged that the appellant had threatened to kill his mother if he disclosed the incidents to anyone.
On 5 March 2019, the child’s uncle allegedly noticed bleeding while the child was passing stool. Upon inquiries by family members, the child disclosed the alleged sexual assault. The appellant was subsequently apprehended by the family members and handed over to the police.
The child was medically examined, and his statement was recorded under Section 164 CrPC. Following investigation, the appellant was charged under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
Trial Court Conviction and Sentence
The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, vide judgment dated 30 November 2023, convicted the appellant for offences under Sections 377 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
The Trial Court relied principally upon the testimony of the child victim, supported by the evidence of his mother and uncle, the school records establishing his age and the medical evidence.
Vide order dated 6 March 2024, the appellant was sentenced to:
- 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, with a fine of ₹10,000.
- 18 months’ simple imprisonment under Section 506 IPC, with a fine of ₹5,000.
- Both substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
The Trial Court also awarded compensation of ₹7,50,000 to the child victim under Section 357A CrPC read with the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018 and the POCSO Rules.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the appellant approached the Delhi High Court.
Contentions Raised by the Appellant
The appellant challenged the conviction on several grounds, principally contending that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.
It was argued that the prosecution case rested primarily upon the testimony of the child, his mother and his uncle, all related witnesses, and that no independent public witness had been examined despite the alleged incident having taken place in a residential building.
The appellant further contended that:
- The child was unable to state the precise dates of the alleged incidents.
- The child described the incidents as occurring during summer, whereas the prosecution alleged that they occurred in February.
- There were discrepancies regarding whether the alleged assault took place inside a room or on a staircase.
- The child’s mother, uncle and the child himself gave different versions concerning the manner in which the incident was disclosed.
- The younger brother, to whom the child allegedly first disclosed the incident, was not examined.
- The child’s paternal aunts, cousins and other residents of the building were not examined.
- The medical examination did not reveal any recent injury or mark of injury over the anal or perianal region.
- The child admitted that he had signed the complaint without reading it and at the instance of his mother.
- The appellant had previous enmity with the child’s uncle, creating a possibility of false implication.
On these grounds, the appellant submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational facts necessary for invoking the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act.
Delhi High Court’s Analysis and Findings
1. Testimony of a Child Victim Can Independently Sustain Conviction
The High Court reiterated the settled principle that the testimony of a child victim can independently form the basis of conviction if it inspires confidence and is found reliable upon careful scrutiny.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court judgments in Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129, and State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh, (2025) 8 SCC 545.
The Court observed that the testimony of a child witness cannot be rejected merely because of tender age or minor discrepancies. The requirement is to carefully assess whether the testimony is voluntary, reliable and free from the influence of tutoring.
The Court further relied upon State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752, while distinguishing normal discrepancies from material discrepancies.
It was held that normal discrepancies arising from errors of observation, memory, lapse of time or the mental disposition of a witness do not necessarily affect the credibility of the evidence.
2. Minor Discrepancies Regarding Date and Time Not Fatal
The High Court observed that the child victim was approximately eight years old at the relevant time and could not reasonably be expected to recollect the exact dates of the incidents.
The child consistently identified the appellant and described the nature of the sexual assault, its repetition and the threats extended to him.
The Court held that his inability to state the precise dates of the incidents did not undermine the prosecution case.
The expression “summer time” used by the child was also not treated as a precise calendar reference capable of discrediting his substantive testimony.
3. Discrepancy Regarding Place of Occurrence Not Sufficient to Discard Testimony
The appellant argued that the prosecution had failed to establish the exact place of occurrence because the child initially referred to a room near the staircase and subsequently stated that the assault took place on the staircase.
The High Court rejected this contention.
The Court observed that the discrepancy concerned the precise spot within the stairway area at Rishi Nagar and did not amount to a complete failure to identify the place of occurrence.
The child had identified photographs depicting the staircase as the place where the appellant used to take him.
The Court held that the testimony of an eight-year-old child cannot be tested with the degree of exactitude expected from an adult witness.
It further observed that the fact that the site plan was initially prepared at the instance of the child’s uncle did not erase the child’s identification of the place of occurrence or render his substantive testimony unreliable.
4. Variations in the Disclosure of Incident Do Not Discredit the Child
The appellant highlighted discrepancies between the testimony of the child, his mother and his uncle concerning how the incident came to light.
The child stated that his mother had suspected something and had asked his younger brother to make inquiries from him. His mother and uncle, however, stated that the uncle noticed bleeding while the child was passing stool, whereafter the mother questioned the child.
The High Court observed that the variations principally concerned the sequence of disclosure and not the actual occurrence of the alleged sexual assault.
The common thread in the testimonies was that bleeding led to inquiries within the family, the child disclosed the acts committed by the appellant and the matter was subsequently reported to the police.
The Court also considered the mother’s leading question concerning Rishi Nagar and held that although the circumstance required careful scrutiny, it did not establish that the entire testimony of the child was fabricated or tutored.
5. Non-Examination of Independent Witnesses Not Fatal
The High Court rejected the argument that the non-examination of the child’s younger brother, paternal aunts, cousins and other residents of the building necessarily warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act.
The Court observed that the younger brother could, at best, have testified regarding the disclosure made to him, while the aunts and cousins could have spoken about the child visiting and playing at Rishi Nagar.
None of these witnesses was stated to be an eyewitness to the penetrative sexual assault.
The Court relied upon Section 134 of the Evidence Act, which provides that no particular number of witnesses is required for proof of any fact.
It held that the quality and reliability of evidence, rather than the number of witnesses, is the decisive consideration.
The testimony of the child victim, having survived detailed cross-examination, was held sufficient to sustain the prosecution case.
6. Absence of Medical Injury Does Not Necessarily Contradict Sexual Assault
An important aspect of the judgment concerns the medical evidence.
The doctor who examined the child found no recent injury over the anal or perianal region and recorded that the sphincters were intact.
However, the medical opinion stated that the possibility of penetration by a penis or penis-like object could not be ruled out.
The doctor also explained that the examination was conducted approximately two weeks after the alleged incidents and that no anal or perianal swab was collected because of the lapse of time and intervening activities such as bathing, changing clothes and passing stool.
The High Court observed that the medical opinion did not independently prove penetration, but equally did not contradict the child’s testimony.
The Court held that penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act does not require proof of bodily injury and that absence of a fresh injury cannot, by itself, determine the outcome of the prosecution.
The conviction was found to rest upon the substantive testimony of the child victim and not upon an assumption that the bleeding had been medically established to have resulted from the assault.
7. Previous Enmity and Defence of False Implication Rejected
The appellant contended that he had previous enmity with the child’s uncle and had been falsely implicated following a quarrel.
The High Court observed that the appellant had not disclosed any specific date, cause or surrounding circumstance of the alleged quarrel and had not led any defence evidence.
Although the Court acknowledged that beating the appellant after he was brought to the child’s house was improper, it held that such circumstance alone did not establish fabrication of the sexual assault allegations.
The defence of false implication was accordingly rejected as an unsubstantiated assertion.
8. Section 29 POCSO Presumption Operates Only After Foundational Facts Are Established
The High Court reaffirmed that Section 29 of the POCSO Act does not dispense with the prosecution’s initial obligation to establish the foundational facts constituting the offence.
In the present case, the Court found that the prosecution had established:
- The age of the child through school records.
- The identity of the appellant through the direct testimony of the child.
- Penile penetration on two occasions.
- Threats extended to prevent disclosure.
- Subsequent disclosure and reporting of the incident.
The Court held that the prosecution had discharged
