786
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 1 of 23
- IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of order : 17th October, 2023 - CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022
KISHAN SWAROOP SHARMA ….. Petitioner
Through: Mr.__, Advocate (Appearance not
given)
versus
SH. AMITABH CHATTERJEE ….. Respondent
Through: Mr.Rajiv Kapur and Mr.Akshit
Kapur, Advocates for SBI
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH
ORDER
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
CM APPL.36611/2022 (condonation of delay)
- The application has been filed by the petitioner, seeking the following
reliefs:
“Condone the delay of 1023 days in filing the contempt
petition…” - Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that
there has been a delay of 1023 days in filing the contempt petition owing to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the petitioner was unable to contact his counsel
and was later apprised of the unfortunate death of his previous counsel, as a
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 2 of 23
result of the pandemic. - It is submitted that Hon‟ble Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance
of the difficulties faced by the litigators and issued certain guidelines,
whereby, the period between 15th March 2020 to 28th February 2022, was
exempted in order to compute the period of limitation, making the present
petition, well within the limitation period. - It is further submitted that the bank, where the petitioner was
employed, extended certain false promises with regard to timely grant of the
back wages to the petitioner, as a result of which the petitioner deferred
approaching this Court. - Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. - It is submitted that the present petition has been filed after an
inordinate delay of 1023 days and the same is not liable to be condoned. - It is submitted that the delay in filing the contempt petition is nothing
but negligence at the hands of the petitioner and as per the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter “Act”), the statutory time period to file a
contempt petition is capped to one year from the alleged period when
contempt has been committed, therefore, the petitioner has lost out on the
opportunity to file the said contempt petition. - In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the present
application may be dismissed, being devoid of any merit. - Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
- In cases where there has been a substantial delay on account of the
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 3 of 23
COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes important for the Courts to take into
consideration the orders issued by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, whereby, the
period between 15th March 2020 to 28th February, 2022, was exempted in
order to compute the period of limitation. - By way of order dated 23rd March, 2020 in Suo Moto Writ Petition
(C) NO. 3 OF 2020, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court issued certain guidelines,
whereby, the period commencing from 15th March, 2020 stood excluded
while computing the period of limitation. The said Order has been
reproduced herein:
“This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation
arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of
Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by
litigants across the country in filing their
petitions/applications/suits/ appeals/all other proceedings
within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law
of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).
To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants
do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in
respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this
Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such
proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the
general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall
stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be
passed by this Court in present proceedings. We are exercising
this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the
Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding
order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals
and authorities. This order may be brought to the notice of all
High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate
Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. Issue
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 4 of 23
notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts,
returnable in four weeks. “ - Subsequently, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 8
th March
2021, concluded the previous order dated 23rd March 2020. Through the
order dated 8th March 2021, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court emphasised that the
relaxation of period between 15th March 2020 and 14th March, 2021 had
concluded and the period of limitation would commence from 15th March - The relevant portion of the order dated 8th March 2021, has been
reproduced herein:
“1. Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took
suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties
that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing
petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within
the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of
limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). By
an order dated 23.03.2020 this Court extended the period of
limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws
whether compoundable or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till
further orders. The order dated 23.03.2020 was extended from
time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic,
there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been
lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the
Courts and Tribunals are functioning either physically or by
virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated
23.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing
scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation
should come to an end.” - In furtherance of the order dated 8th March 2021 the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, vide order dated 27th April 2021, restored the order dated 23rd March
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 5 of 23
2020 and the same was concluded vide order dated 23rd September 2021. - However, the country saw a surge in cases as a result of the Omicron
variant, which brought a halt to the Court proceedings yet again. In context
of the Omicron variant, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Association filed a Miscellaneous Application, thereby, seeking restoration
of order dated 23rd March 2020. In view of the said Miscellaneous
Application, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court restored the order dated 23rd March
2020, which reads as follows:
“I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation
of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and
23.09.2021 it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till
28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation
as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in
respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings.,
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as
on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from
01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during
the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding
the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons
shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In
the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with
effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer
period shall apply….” - The aforesaid orders were applicable under any general or special laws
in respect to all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. Bearing in mind the
same, the cause of action for the instant petition arose on 19th September
2019, i.e., the date of the impugned order.
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 6 of 23 - Moreover, the law regarding filing of contempt petition has been
reiterated by different Courts time and again. A bare perusal of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 makes it evident that there is a prescribed time limit for
filing of a contempt petition. The relevant portion of the said Act is
reproduced herein:
“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.-No court shall
initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion
or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the
date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” - As per the above stated statute, there is a time limit prescribed to
contempt petitions, which is capped at one year from the date on which the
alleged contempt has been committed. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has
analysed Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 on numerous
instances. In the case titled Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, it
held as follows:
“43. A question arose before a Full Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of Manjit Singh v. Darshan
Singh [1984 Cri LJ 301 : (1984) 86 Punj LR 9 (P&H) (FB)]
with regard to the application of Section 20 to the proceedings
of criminal contempt. After coming to the conclusion that on the
language of Section 20 the date when the time begins to run is
fixed from the point on which the criminal contempt is alleged
to have been committed the Court had to decide the terminating
point or the terminus ad quem for the limitation under Section
20 of the Act. Four possibilities which fell for consideration in
this regard were: (i) the date on which the actual notice of
contempt is issued by the court; (ii) the date on which the
Advocate-General moves the motion under Section 15(1)(a);
(iii) the date on which a subordinate court makes a reference of
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 7 of 23
the criminal contempt under Section 15(2) of the Act; and (iv)
the date on which any other person prefers an application to the
Advocate-General for his consent under Section 15(1)(b) of the
Act. On behalf of the State, the contention raised before the Full
Bench was that the sole terminus ad quem was the date of the
actual issuance of the notice of criminal contempt by the court
and reliance in this behalf was inter alia placed on the
abovementioned decision of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra
case [(1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99] . The Full Bench,
in our opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that the sole
question which arose for consideration in Baradakanta Mishra
case [(1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99] related to the
interpretation of Section 19 of the Act and no question of
interpreting or applying Section 20 was at all in issue.
Following the dictum of Lord Halsbury
in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : (1900-3) All ER Rep 1 : 70
LJPC 76 : 85 LT 289] that a case is only an authority on what it
actually decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition that
may even seem to follow logically therefrom, the Full Bench
correctly observed that Baradakanta Mishra case [(1975) 3
SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99] was no warrant for the
proposition that the issuance of a notice of criminal contempt by
the High Court is the sole terminus ad quem for determining
limitation under Section 20 of the Act. The Court then
proceeded to observe in paras 13 and 19 as follows: (Cri LJ pp.
305-06 & 308)
“13. Once that is so, one must now proceed to analyse and
construe Section 20 independently. A plain reading thereof
would indicate that the legislature drew a clear line of
distinction betwixt proceedings for contempt initiated by the
court on its own motion, and those not so done. Suo motu action
by the High Court is thus clearly a class by itself. Consequently
the statute in express terms refers to these two classes
separately, namely, any proceedings for contempt on court’s
own motion, and proceedings for contempt initiated „otherwise‟.
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 8 of 23
The use of the word „otherwise‟ is significant and indeed
provides the clue to the true interpretation of Section 20.
Therefore, initiation of contempt proceedings otherwise than on
court’s own motion would include within its sweep a motion by
the Advocate-General, a reference by a subordinate court to the
High Court to take action for contempt and an application
before the Advocate-General seeking his consent by any other
person under Section 15 and lastly in cases of civil contempt the
motion by a private litigant directly in the court.
- To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a
quo for limitation begins under Section 20 of the Act on the date
on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The
terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would
necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking
cognizance thereof provided for in Section 15. In cases where it
is initiated on the court’s own motion it would necessarily be
from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the court. In
case of a motion by the Advocate-General under Section
15(1)(a), the proceedings would initiate from the date of the
filing of such a motion in the High Court. Where any other
person moves the Advocate-General for his consent in writing
as prescribed in Section 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings
would be with effect from the date of such application. Lastly, in
cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate court on a
reference made by it the proceedings must be deemed to be
initiated from the date when such reference is made.”” - In the aforesaid case, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court essentially
established that the starting point for the limitation period on contempt cases,
as stipulated under Section 20 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter “Act”), is
the date on which the alleged contempt took place. The endpoint, in the
context of contempt, varies and is associated with the methods specified in
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 9 of 23
Section 15 of the Act, for taking cognizance of such contempt. If the Court
initiates the proceedings on its own accord, the limitation period commences
from the moment the Court issues a notice for contempt. When the
Advocate-General files a motion under Section 15(1)(a), the proceedings
begin on the date of submission of that motion in the High Court. If any
other individual requests the Advocate-General’s written consent, as outlined
in Section 15(1)(b), the proceedings start from the date of such an
application. - Adverting back to the facts of the instant petition, the alleged
contempt commenced on 19th September 2019.In accordance with Section 20
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the period to file the contempt petition
ended on 20th September 2020. However, due to the sou moto cognizance
taken by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the period between 15th March 2020 to
28th February 2022, stood exempted and the period of limitation was to be
computed from 1st March 2022. - The instant writ petition has been filed on 5
th July 2022 therefore, the
present petition has been filed within the period of limitation. - In view of the above facts and discussions, the delay has been
condoned for the reasons so stated in the application as well as the above
discussions and therefore, the application stands allowed. - Accordingly, the application stands disposed of.
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 10 of 23
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 - The instant contempt petition under Sections 11 and 12 of the
Contempt of Court Act,1971, has been filed on behalf of petitioner seeking
the following reliefs:-
“a) Punish the contemnors in accordance with the law;
b)Direct the petitioners to start paying minimum wages
alongwith appropriate interest for the delayed period; as
directed by the Hon‟ble High court in the judgment and order
dated 19.09.2019.
c)Award the cost of the petition to the Respondent/ applicant…” - The respondent herein had filed writ petition bearing no. 10177/2017,
thereby, challenging award bearing ID No.65/2007, dated 4
th August 2016,
passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Karkardooma, Delhi. - A Coordinate Bench of this Court, modified the said award vide order
dated 19th September 2019, thereby directing the respondents herein to
reinstate the petitioner/workman within two months after expiry of the
remedy period available against the said award, alongwith payment of 25%
backwages. - By way of the aforesaid order, this Court directed the respondent
herein to file an affidavit undertaking to refund the differential amount
between the last drawn wages and the minimum wages in the event that the
writ petition is allowed. Following the said directions, the petitioner filed an
affidavit on 14
th October, 2019 and made a representation dated 22nd
October, 2019 thereby, seeking minimum wage from the date of the award
i.e. 4
th August, 2016. However, the respondent has failed to comply with the
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 11 of 23
order dated 19th September, 2019. - Aggrieved by the non-compliance of the said order, the petitioner has
preferred the present petition. - Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that
the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order dated 19th September,
2019 passed by this Court, and have failed to sanction the backwages of the
petitioner as directed by aforesaid order. - It is submitted that though the respondents have paid Rs. 2,34,160/- as
on 27th September, 2019,due as backwages to the petitioner, the said amount
is meagre in comparison to the wages due as on date of passing of the
impugned award. - It is further submitted that the total payment due to the petitioner
stands at Rs.12,22,362/-, however, the respondents have only paid Rs.
2,34,160/-, thereby owing the petitioner an amount of Rs.9,88,202/- along
with Rs.16,518/- as monthly payment of last drawn wages. - In view of the submissions, it is prayed that the present petition may
be allowed and the respondent may be held guilty of contempt of the Court. - Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
submitted that the respondent has been impleaded wrongfully, thereby,
alleging him to be Chief General Manager, Local Head Office (LHO), New
Delhi; whereas, he is Deputy Managing Director (DMD) at Corporate
Office, Mumbai . The Controlling Authority of the workman/petitioner is
Regional Manager, at, New Delhi and not the present respondent. - It is further submitted that the present respondent deals with the policy
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 12 of 23
matter and has no knowledge pertaining to the writ petition whose contempt
has been allegedly committed. - It is submitted that the bank has complied with the order dated 19th
September, 2019, wherein the Court had directed the respondent to pay last
drawn/minimum wages which is higher pursuant to which the respondent
made a payment of Rs. 2,34,247/- to the petitioner and hence the present
petition stands to be infructuous . - It is further submitted that the delay in processing the backwages of
the petitioner was a bonafide mistake and not a deliberate act of
disobedience at the hands of the bank. The said delay was a result of transfer
of certain officials and lack of staff at the offices of the bank where the
petitioner was employed. - In view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the present
petition is devoid of any merit. - Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
- It has been contended that the present petition has been preferred
against order dated 19th September 2019, in C.M. No. 15905/2018 under
Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in W.P.(C)
No.10177/2017. The said writ petition was preferred by the State Bank of
India, i.e., the employer of the petitioner, aggrieved by an award dated 4th
August 2016, passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal
in I.D. No. 65/2007 against the employee/petitioner herein and the same is
pending adjudication before this Court. - It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent has wilfully
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 13 of 23
disobeyed the order of this Court whereby the respondents were directed to
reinstate the petitioner/workman within two months after expiry of the
period available remedy against the said award and pay 25% back wages.
They have merely paid Rs. 2,34,160/- as against the amount of
Rs.9,88,202/- due to the petitioner. - It has been contended that the respondent herein has been wrongfully
impleaded since the Competent Authority of the workman/petitioner is
Regional Manager, Local Head Office, New Delhi and not the respondent
who is the Deputy Managing Director (DMD) at Corporate Office, Mumbai
and moreover, there has been no wilful disobedience at the hands of the
respondent. - In order to adjudicate the present petition, it is apposite to analyse the
impugned order dated 19th September 2019. The relevant portion of the same
has been reproduced herein:
“4. In these circumstances, the respondent/applicant is entitled
to succeed, and the application is, accordingly, allowed. The
petitioner is directed to pay last drawn wages/minimum wages,
whichever is higher, to the respondent from the date of passing
of the impugned Award. The upto date arrears would be paid to
the respondent within a period of twelve weeks from today. The
petitioner will during the pendency of the present petition,
continue to pay the last drawn wages/minimum wages, as the
case may be, to the respondent on or before the tenth day of
every month. The respondent will within a period of four weeks,
file an affidavit undertaking to refund the differential amount
between the last drawn wages and the minimum wages in case
the writ petition is allowed.
5.The application is disposed of.”
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 14 of 23 - Pursuant to non-compliance of the direction of the Court by the
respondent, the petitioner has preferred the present contempt petition. - Before adverting on the merits of the case. The Court will first discuss
the necessary ingredients to establish contempt. - The term “Civil Contempt” has been defined under Section 2 (b) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and it reads as follows:
“2. Definitions
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.” - The aforesaid provision makes it evident that the existence of „wilful
disobedience‟ is an essential ingredient in order to initiate contempt
proceedings against any party. The said principle has been dealt with time
and again by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. - In U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., (2022) 1 SCC 101,
has analysed the term „wilful disobedience‟ and how it is a necessary
ingredient for initiating contempt proceedings:
“Discussion - We are dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a wilful
disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what is
relevant is the “wilful” disobedience. Knowledge acquires
substantial importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a
subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the
Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the
absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the
element of wilfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 15 of 23
is a deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required
is a proof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are
quasi-criminal in nature. Similarly, when a distinct mechanism
is provided and that too, in the same judgment alleged to have
been violated, a party has to exhaust the same before
approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party
to contend that the benefit of the order passed has not been
actually given, through separate proceedings while seeking
appropriate relief but certainly not by way of a contempt
proceeding. While dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is
not expected to conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond the very
judgment which was allegedly violated. The said principle has
to be applied with more vigour when disputed questions of facts
are involved and they were raised earlier but consciously not
dealt with by creating a specific forum to decide the original
proceedings. - We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid settled principle
of law except by quoting the reasoned decision of this Court
in Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal [Hukum Chand
Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, (2021) 13 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 438] wherein the celebrated judgment in Ram
Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj [Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16
SCC 204 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 311] , has been quoted. The
following paragraphs would govern the aforesaid principle :
(Hukum Chand Deswal case [Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish
Raj Deswal, (2021) 13 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 438] ,
SCC paras 20-21 & 25-27)
“20. At the outset, we must advert to the contours delineated
by this Court for initiating civil contempt action in Ram
Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj [Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16
SCC 204 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 311] . In paras 11, 12 and 15 of
the reported decision, this Court noted thus : (SCC pp. 209-11)
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 16 of 23
„11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts
power to punish an offender for his wilful
disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority
commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to
an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the
entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the
respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the
contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the
courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution
and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it
would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to
exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasicriminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in
these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would
rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere
probabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta [V.G.
Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992) 4 SCC 697 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 202] , Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati [Chhotu
Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 : 2001 SCC (L&S)
1196] , Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh [Anil Ratan
Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21] , Bank of
Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya [Bank of
Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360]
, Sahdeo v. State of U.P. [Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC
705 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 451] and National Fertilizers
Ltd. v. TuncayAlankus [National Fertilizers
Ltd. v. TuncayAlankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)
481 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 172] .) - Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is “wilful”. The word
“wilful” introduces a mental element and hence, requires
looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his
actions, which is an indication of one’s state of mind. “Wilful”
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 17 of 23
means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and
deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing
therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or
unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not
encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be
done with a “bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or
stubbornly, obstinately or perversely”. Wilful act is to be
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done
negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person
means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the
same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil
motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order,
but such disobedience is the result of some compelling
circumstances under which it was not possible for the
contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be
punished. “Committal or sequestration will not be ordered
unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct.”
(Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram
Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591] , Rakapalli
Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda
Sehararao [Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani
Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255] , Niaz Mohd. v. State of
Haryana [Niaz Mohd. v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332]
, Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa[Chordia Automobiles v. S.
Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282] , Ashok Paper Kamgar
Union v. DharamGodha [Ashok Paper Kamgar
Union v. DharamGodha, (2003) 11 SCC 1] , State of
Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006)
1 SCC 275 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 122] and Uniworth Textiles
Ltd. v. CCE [Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9 SCC 753]
.
- It is well-settled principle of law that if two
interpretations are possible, and if the action is not
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 18 of 23
contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be
maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken
into consideration and the same must be read in its entirety.
Therefore, the element of willingness is an indispensable
requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the
Act. [See Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak [Sushila Raje
Holkar v. Anil Kak, (2008) 14 SCC 392 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S)
497] and Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC
Ltd. [Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008)
16 SCC 592] ] - Similarly, in R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik [R.N.
Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400] , this Court
expounded in para 7 as follows : (SCC p. 404)
„7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to be
used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for
execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which
alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to
the court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court’s
dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no
right to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as
contempt is between a contemner and the court. It is true that in
the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pending
and has ordered that it should be heard along with the first
appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the
coercion of contempt proceeding, the appellants cannot be
directed to pay the compensation amount which they are
disputing by asserting that claimants were not the owners of the
property in question and that decree was obtained by
suppressing the material fact and by fraud. Even presuming that
the claimants are entitled to recover the amount of
compensation as awarded by the trial court as no stay order is
granted by the High Court, at the most they are entitled to
recover the same by executing the said award wherein the State
can or may contend that the award is a nullity. In such a
situation, as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 19 of 23
the order, the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly
unjustified.‟
- Pertinently, the special leave petitions were filed by the
respondent against the order dated 28-1-2019 [Sagu
Dreamland (P) Ltd. v. Jingal Bell Amusement Park (P) Ltd.,
2019 SCC OnLine Del 6720] , which as aforesaid, did not deal
with the question regarding the monthly rent payable by the
respondent but explicitly left the parties to pursue the same
before the executing court. The plaintiff-petitioner having
acquiesced of that observation of the High Court, cannot be
allowed to contend to the contrary. This Court in Jhareswar
Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [Jhareswar Prasad
Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC
(L&S) 703] , in para 11, opined thus : (SCC p. 360)
„11. … The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not
entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with
and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is
alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction
issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question
as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the
cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising
contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question
of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have
committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in
the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain
any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any
ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better
to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the
matter for clarification of the order instead of the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the
court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne
in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the
courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “that it has
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 20 of 23
exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a
direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the
dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid
multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is
prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the
contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh
directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give
rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding
which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.‟
- Thus understood, we find force in the explanation offered
by the respondent that as per its bona fide understanding, there
was no outstanding dues payable to the petitioner. Moreover, as
observed [Sagu Dreamland (P) Ltd. v. Jingal Bell Amusement
Park (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6720] by the High Court,
these aspects could be answered by the executing court if the
parties pursue their claim(s) before it in that regard. Suffice it
to observe that it is not a case of intentional violation or wilful
disobedience of the order passed by this Court to initiate
contempt action against the respondent. Instead, we hold that it
would be open to the parties to pursue their claim(s) in
execution proceedings or any other proceedings, as may be
permissible in law in respect of the issue(s) under
consideration. In such proceedings, all aspects can be
considered by the forum/court concerned on merits in
accordance with law. We say no more. - Reverting to the allegation about damage caused to the
suit property by the respondent at the time of vacating the same,
in our opinion, the respondent has made out a formidable case
that it did not cause any damage, much less permanent damage
to the structure in the suit property. Whereas, the petitioner was
relying on photographs concerning the debris on the site left
behind at the time of vacating the suit property. The debris
cannot cause damage and it is certainly not a case of
defacement of the suit property. That position is reinforced from
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 21 of 23
the fact that the water park in the suit premises was started and
became fully functional within 2-3 months. Viewed thus, it is
rightly urged that it can be safely assumed that no damage was
caused by the respondent to the structure in question. Minor
repairs required to be carried out by the petitioner for making
the water park functional cannot be painted as intentional
disobedience of the order of this Court. In any case, that being a
complex question of fact, need not be adjudicated in the
contempt proceedings. We leave it open to the petitioner to
pursue even that claim in execution proceedings or such other
proceedings as may be permissible in law. We may not be
understood to have expressed any final opinion in respect of
condition of the suit premises, whilst handing over possession to
the petitioner. We hold that even this issue under consideration
does not warrant initiation of contempt action against the
respondent.
(emphasis supplied)” - In view of the aforesaid judicial principles, it is clear that „wilful
disobedience‟ must be proved by the petitioner in order to be successful in
the contempt proceedings against the contemnor. The term „wilful
disobedience‟ is something which must be proven as a whole, rather than on
certain assumptions, making it imperative for this Court to analyse whether
mere non-compliance with the order of the predecessor bench would amount
to wilful disobedience. - In the instant petition, even though it has been alleged by the
petitioner that the respondent herein has failed to pay last drawn/minimum
wages, whichever is higher, as directed vide order dated 19th September - However, the respondent bank has submitted that an amount of Rs.
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 22 of 23
2,34,247/- has already been paid to the petitioner, making the present
petition infructuous. Moreover, it has been contended that the delay in
sanctioning such payment was a result of certain personnel changes and lack
of staff at the bank where the petitioner was employed and such delay is not
a deliberate act of disobedience, but a bonafide mistake. - Furthermore, it has been submitted by the respondent that he has been
wrongfully impleaded in the present petition. It is pertinent to note that the
present respondent is the Deputy Managing Director (DMD) at Corporate
Office, Mumbai and the Controlling Authority of the workman/petitioner is
Regional Manager, at New Delhi and not the present respondent. Further, the
respondent‟s responsibility is limited to policy changes only and is in no way
the controlling authority of the workman/petitioner. - It is apparent, that for a contempt proceeding to fructify, there should
be a clear presence of wilful disobedience at the hands of the contemnor,
which should be proven by the applicant before the Court. In the instant
petition, the applicant has failed to make a clear-cut case of contempt
committed by the bank. - Since the respondent has already paid the petitioner Rs. 2,34,247/- as
directed by this Court vide order dated 19th September 2019, there is no
wilful disobedience established in the instant petition. - In view of the presented facts and circumstances, the Court is reluctant
to commence civil contempt proceedings against the respondents. This
decision stems from the petitioner‟s failure to meet the necessary criteria
outlined in statutory provisions and judicial precedents.
CONT.CAS(C) 871/2022 Page 23 of 23 - Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed.
- The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J
OCTOBER 17, 2023
Dy/ds/db
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