Supreme Court Case Note:

Subject: Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court — Quashing of proceedings under Section 12 — Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS — Scope and limitations of judicial interference.

Citation: 2025 INSC 734 | Criminal Appeal Nos. 2688 and 2689 of 2025 | Decided on 19 May 2025 | Supreme Court of India | Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Headnote

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — Sections 12, 18–23, 27, 28 and 29 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 528.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and its corresponding provision, Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to quash proceedings initiated on an application under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The predominantly civil nature of the reliefs available under the Domestic Violence Act does not, by itself, exclude the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

However, such jurisdiction must be exercised with exceptional restraint, keeping in view the beneficial and remedial object of the legislation. The High Court should ordinarily refrain from interfering unless the case involves gross illegality, gross abuse of the process of law, or circumstances warranting intervention to prevent injustice. The impugned view that proceedings under Section 12(1) could not be quashed because they were civil in nature was held to be incorrect.

Held: The appeals were allowed; the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 9 May 2024 was set aside, and the quashing petitions were restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgment.

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734, is a significant ruling on the scope of the High Court’s inherent powers in proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter, “the DV Act”).

The central legal question was whether proceedings instituted before a Magistrate under Section 12(1) of the DV Act could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The controversy arose because proceedings under the DV Act are predominantly civil in nature, even though they are initiated before a criminal court and governed, subject to the statutory scheme, by criminal procedure. The High Court had rejected the appellants’ petitions on the ground that proceedings under Section 12 could not be quashed because they were civil in nature.

The Supreme Court rejected this categorical approach. It clarified that the civil character of the proceedings does not eliminate the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. At the same time, it emphasised that the power must be exercised sparingly and with particular regard to the DV Act’s welfare-oriented purpose.

The judgment therefore establishes an important distinction between the existence of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and the limited circumstances in which that jurisdiction should actually be exercised.

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2. Facts of the case

The appeals arose from a matrimonial dispute between Vidhi Rawal and her husband, Prateek Tripathi, and members of his family.

Prateek Tripathi married Vidhi Rawal on 12 December 2019 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals at Dewas, Madhya Pradesh.

According to the respondent’s allegations, disputes arose after approximately two years of marriage. On 8 December 2021, she made a complaint to the Station House Officer at the Women Consultancy Centre, Dewas, alleging dowry demands against her husband and father-in-law.

Subsequently, on 7 January 2022, an FIR was registered as FIR No. 3 of 2022 at Mahila Thana, Dewas, under Sections 498A, 504, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations included mental and physical harassment connected with demands for dowry, specifically ₹20 lakh in cash and a top-model SUV.

On 2 March 2022, the respondent filed an application bearing MJCR No. 215/2022 before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, under Section 12 of the DV Act. She sought reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Act, including protection, residence, monetary, custody and compensation-related reliefs.

The appellants filed petitions under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings arising from the application under Section 12. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed those petitions by its order dated 9 May 2024, reasoning that proceedings under the DV Act were civil in nature and therefore could not be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.

Aggrieved by that decision, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

3. Issues before the Supreme Court

The principal questions of law were:

1. Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings arising from an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act.

2. Whether the predominantly civil nature of proceedings under the DV Act excludes the application of the High Court’s inherent powers.

3. What limitations and safeguards should govern the exercise of that jurisdiction in view of the beneficial object of the DV Act.

The Supreme Court confined its adjudication to proceedings arising from applications under Section 12(1) presented before the Magistrate under Section 27. It expressly distinguished these proceedings from situations in which reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 are sought in other pending civil, family or criminal proceedings under Section 26 of the Act.

4. Arguments advanced by the parties

A. Submissions on behalf of the appellants

The appellants contended that applications under Section 12 are entertained by Judicial Magistrates of the First Class or Metropolitan Magistrates, who are criminal courts under the applicable procedural legislation.

They argued that the jurisdiction of the High Court could not be determined merely by examining whether the reliefs available under the DV Act were civil or criminal in character. According to them, the fact that the application was presented before a criminal court and that the proceedings were governed by the CrPC supported the availability of inherent jurisdiction.

Reliance was placed on decisions of the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts recognising the maintainability of petitions under Section 482 CrPC against proceedings under the DV Act.

B. Submissions on behalf of the respondent

The respondent argued that proceedings under Section 12 were predominantly civil in nature and that the legislature intended the DV Act to provide civil remedies for the protection of women against domestic violence.

Reliance was placed on Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, (2016) 11 SCC 774, in which the Supreme Court recognised the predominantly civil nature of proceedings under the Act.

It was further submitted that an application under Section 12 is not a complaint under Section 200 CrPC, and that the procedural framework applicable to criminal complaints cannot automatically be applied to an application seeking remedies under the DV Act.

5. Statutory framework considered by the Court

The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the DV Act, particularly the following provisions.

Provision	Subject matter	Relevance to the decision
Section 2(i)	Definition of Magistrate	Identifies the judicial authority empowered to entertain applications under the Act.
Section 12	Application to Magistrate	Provides the mechanism for seeking relief under the Act.
Sections 17–22	Residence, protection, monetary relief, custody and compensation	Establish the substantive remedies available to an aggrieved person.
Section 23	Interim and ex parte orders	Enables urgent protective relief where appropriate.
Section 26	Relief in other suits and legal proceedings	Permits specified DV Act reliefs in other pending proceedings.
Section 27	Jurisdiction	Identifies the competent Magistrate’s court.
Section 28	Procedure	Provides for the application of criminal procedure, subject to the Act.
Section 29	Appeal	Provides an appeal to the Court of Session against an order passed by the Magistrate.
Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS	Inherent powers of the High Court	Supplies the jurisdictional basis for quashing proceedings in appropriate cases.

The Court emphasised that the DV Act is intended to provide effective protection to women against domestic violence, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse.

Its remedial scheme is not limited to punishment. It includes residence rights, protection against further violence, financial support, child custody arrangements and compensation for injuries, mental torture and emotional distress.

This statutory context was central to the Court’s determination of the appropriate limits on the High Court’s jurisdiction.

6. The distinction between an application under Section 12 and a criminal complaint

One of the important aspects of the judgment is the Court’s examination of the legal character of an application under Section 12(1).

The Court held that such an application cannot be equated with a complaint under Section 200 CrPC or Section 223 BNSS.

In an ordinary criminal complaint, the Magistrate follows the prescribed process for examining the complainant and witnesses, where applicable, before deciding whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused.

An application under Section 12 operates differently. The Magistrate is required to fix the first hearing date, ordinarily within three days of receiving the application, and notice is served on the respondent in accordance with the statutory framework.

The Court also considered Section 28(2), which empowers the court to devise its own procedure for disposing of applications under Section 12 and certain applications under Section 23.

Consequently, the proceedings are governed by a distinctive statutory framework that combines criminal-court jurisdiction with predominantly civil and protective remedies.

The Court’s reasoning demonstrates that the legal character of the relief and the procedural forum must be analysed separately. The fact that proceedings are predominantly civil does not, by itself, answer the question whether the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction over them.

7. The Court’s analysis of Section 482 CrPC

The Court examined the two principal aspects of Section 482 CrPC.

A. Power to give effect to orders under the Code

The first part of Section 482 preserves the High Court’s inherent powers to make orders necessary to give effect to orders under the CrPC.

The Supreme Court held that this part did not apply to proceedings under Section 12(1) in the circumstances under consideration. A notice issued on an application under Section 12 is not an order passed under the CrPC, and the substantive reliefs granted under Sections 18 to 23 arise under the DV Act rather than under the Code.

Accordingly, the first part of Section 482 could not independently sustain the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in these proceedings.

B. Power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice

The second part of Section 482 preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

The Supreme Court held that this part was applicable.

Since applications under Section 12 are entertained by criminal courts constituted under the relevant procedural legislation, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings arising from such applications where the circumstances justify intervention.

The Court therefore rejected the proposition that the civil nature of the remedies available under the DV Act creates an absolute bar to the exercise of Section 482 jurisdiction.

This was the central legal holding of the judgment.

8. Why the civil nature of proceedings does not bar quashing jurisdiction

The Supreme Court accepted that proceedings under the DV Act are predominantly civil in nature, relying on its earlier decisions in Kunapareddy and Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90.

However, the Court distinguished the nature of the relief from the jurisdiction of the court dealing with the proceeding.

The DV Act creates a special statutory remedy intended to protect women from domestic violence. Although the Magistrate may grant orders with substantial consequences for the respondent, the proceedings under Section 12 do not, by themselves, constitute a criminal trial in which the respondent is sentenced to imprisonment or fined for the alleged domestic violence.

Criminal prosecution may arise separately where the statutory conditions for an offence are satisfied, including breach of a protection order under Section 31.

The Court’s reasoning may be summarised as follows:

• The proceedings under Section 12 are predominantly civil in nature.
• They are nevertheless entertained by a criminal court under the statutory scheme.
• The civil nature of the proceedings does not extinguish the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of judicial process.
• The existence of jurisdiction does not mean that the High Court should routinely interfere with DV Act proceedings.

Thus, the judgment avoids both extremes: it does not exclude inherent jurisdiction altogether, nor does it permit routine quashing of protective proceedings.

9. The controlling principle: restraint and circumspection

The most important practical aspect of the judgment is the Supreme Court’s direction concerning the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The Court recognised that the DV Act is welfare legislation enacted to provide effective remedies to women experiencing domestic violence. Unwarranted interference at the threshold could undermine the protective purpose of the legislation.

Accordingly, the Court held that High Courts must be “very slow and circumspect” when considering applications to quash proceedings under Section 12(1).

Interference is ordinarily justified only where the case involves gross illegality, gross abuse of the process of law, or circumstances in which intervention is necessary to prevent injustice.

The Court also emphasised the significance of Section 29, which provides an appeal to the Court of Session against an order passed by the Magistrate. The availability of this statutory remedy reinforces the need for caution in exercising extraordinary inherent jurisdiction.

The judgment therefore establishes a two-stage approach:

1

Jurisdictional question

The High Court has the power to quash proceedings arising from an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS.

2

Discretionary question

The power must be exercised sparingly, ordinarily only in cases of gross illegality, abuse of process or injustice, having regard to the protective purpose of the DV Act.

This distinction is essential. The judgment recognises the availability of the remedy without converting it into a routine mechanism for interrupting proceedings under the DV Act.

10. Correction of the earlier legal position

In paragraph 37, the Supreme Court expressly held that decisions of High Courts denying the availability of Section 482 jurisdiction solely because proceedings under Section 12 are predominantly civil in nature were incorrect.

The Court also addressed an earlier Bombay High Court judgment in which a view had been taken that Section 482 could not be invoked to quash such proceedings. Justice Abhay S. Oka acknowledged his participation in that earlier decision and observed that judges have a duty to correct mistakes in properly constituted proceedings.

This passage is notable for its judicial candour. More importantly, it confirms that the binding principle emerging from the Supreme Court’s judgment is that the High Court’s jurisdiction exists, although its exercise remains subject to strict judicial restraint.

11. Final decision

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals.

It set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order dated 9 May 2024 in Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023 and restored the quashing petitions to the High Court’s file.

The High Court was directed to hear and dispose of the restored petitions afresh in light of the principles laid down in the Supreme Court’s judgment.

Importantly, the Supreme Court did not itself quash the underlying domestic violence proceedings or determine the truth of the respondent’s allegations. It corrected the legal position concerning maintainability and remitted the petitions for fresh consideration.

12. Legal commentary and implications

A. For respondents seeking quashing of DV Act proceedings

The judgment confirms that a respondent may invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to challenge proceedings arising from an application under Section 12(1).

However, a petition cannot succeed merely by asserting that the dispute is matrimonial, that the reliefs are civil in nature, or that the DV Act proceedings are governed by a special statutory scheme.

The applicant must demonstrate grounds that justify exceptional interference, consistent with the standards articulated by the Court.

B. For women seeking protection under the DV Act

The ruling preserves the ability of aggrieved women to pursue the remedies provided by the legislation without facing an automatic jurisdictional objection at the threshold.

The Court’s insistence on restraint is particularly significant because applications under the Act may involve immediate protection, residence, maintenance and other forms of relief.

The decision does not make DV Act proceedings immune from judicial scrutiny. Instead, it ensures that scrutiny takes place within a framework that respects the protective purpose of the legislation.

C. For Magistrates and appellate courts

The judgment clarifies the distinct statutory character of applications under Section 12 and the importance of the procedural scheme contained in Sections 12, 13, 23, 28 and 29.

It also reinforces the need to distinguish proceedings seeking civil protective remedies from criminal prosecutions for offences.

D. For practitioners invoking Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS

The decision requires practitioners to distinguish between maintainability and merits.

A petition may be legally maintainable without necessarily warranting quashing. Pleadings should therefore identify the specific alleged illegality or abuse of process and explain why the case meets the restrictive standard for interference.

The availability of an appeal under Section 29 should also be considered when assessing the appropriate procedural remedy against a Magistrate’s order.

E. Relationship between the CrPC and BNSS

The judgment expressly recognises Section 528 BNSS as the corresponding source of inherent jurisdiction under the new procedural framework.

Its central reasoning concerning the availability of inherent powers and the need for restraint is therefore relevant to cases governed by the BNSS as well. The applicable procedural provision will depend on the statutory framework governing the particular proceeding.

13. Conclusion

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734, settles an important question concerning the relationship between the predominantly civil remedies under the DV Act and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot refuse to entertain a quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS merely because proceedings under Section 12(1) are civil in nature. At the same time, the Court made clear that the existence of jurisdiction is not an invitation to routine interference.

The judgment strikes a balance between two important considerations: the need to prevent abuse of judicial process and the need to preserve the effective operation of legislation enacted to protect women from domestic violence.

Its enduring contribution lies in the principle that inherent jurisdiction remains available, but its exercise must be governed by exceptional circumstances, judicial restraint and fidelity to the purpose of the statute.

Case digest at a glance

Court and authority

Supreme Court of India — 2025 INSC 734

Principal statutory provisions

Section 12, DV Act; Sections 28–29, DV Act; Section 482 CrPC; Section 528 BNSS.

Ratio decidendi

Predominantly civil proceedings under Section 12(1) may be quashed under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, but only with exceptional restraint.

Disposition

Appeals allowed; High Court’s order set aside; quashing petitions restored for fresh consideration.

Source note: This article is based on the judgment text supplied in the uploaded document. The case details, statutory analysis and disposition have been drawn from that text. No independent verification of the judgment or additional authorities has been undertaken.