IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 13.07.2026
Pronounced on: 21.07. 2026
Uploaded on: 21.07.2026
- CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
CHRISTINE SWAROOP RAJ & ORS. …..Petitioners
Through: Ms. Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Pravir Singh, Adv.
versus
STATE & ORS. …..Respondents
Through: Mr. Digam Singh Dagar, APP
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
J U D G M E N T
MADHU JAIN, J.
- This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
- The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 has been preferred assailing the order dated 22.03.2012
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-02 (South), Saket Courts,
New Delhi in Sessions Case No. 42/2011, whereby charges were directed to
be framed against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section
3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
FACTUAL MATRIX - Petitioner No.1 was serving as the Administrative and Human
Resources Director, Petitioner No.2 as the Chief Executive Officer, Petitioner
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 2 of 20
No.3 as the Supervisor and Petitioner No.4 as the Technical Director of Trans
World Radio India. Respondent Nos.2 to 6/complainants were employed with
the said organisation as safai karamcharis. - The record reflects that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
respondent No.2 (Ram Babu) on 17.12.2007 on allegations of misconduct
arising out of an incident dated 23.10.2007. The enquiry culminated in a
finding against him, pursuant to which he was dismissed from service by order
dated 25.04.2008. - Prior to the order of dismissal, the complainants submitted complaints
dated 10.01.2008 and 15.02.2008 before the SHO, Police Station Hauz Khas
and other authorities, alleging that they were being subjected to pressure to
convert to Christianity, were threatened with termination from service and
were being discriminated against by the management of Trans World Radio
India. - Thereafter, on 29.02.2008, the complainants instituted a complaint
under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 before the learned
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate alleging, inter alia, that the petitioners had
intentionally insulted and humiliated them by addressing them with castebased abuses, including the expressions ‘Bhan’ and ‘Cham’, on different
occasions during the months of June, August and October, 2007 and on
15.01.2008. - During the course of enquiry, the police submitted a report dated
27.05.2008 wherein it was observed that the allegations levelled by the
complainants were not substantiated during the enquiry. The report also noted
that the earlier complaints addressed to the police primarily contained
allegations relating to religious conversion and discrimination and did not
specifically refer to any caste-based remarks. Statements of certain other
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 3 of 20
employees of the organisation were also recorded, who stated that they had
not been subjected to any pressure for religious conversion or similar
treatment. - Upon consideration of the material placed before it, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, by the impugned order dated 22.03.2012, found
that a prima facie case was made out and directed framing of charge against
the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The relevant extracts of the impugned judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:
“Heard.
In their complaint dated 29.02.2008 and in the presummoning evidence, recorded on 05.05.2008, the
complainants disclosed that in June 2007, accused
No. 2 made casteist remarks to complainant No. 1
in her office.
Further, in August 2007, accused No. 3 is alleged
to have made caste remarks to complainant No. 2
again in her office. In October 2007, accused No. 4
allegedly made caste remarks to complainant No. 1
yet again, in his office. Thus, the caste remarks,
admittedly, were made in the office of the accused
persons.
Now, the question is if such remarks were ever made
by the respondents in their office as alleged and
secondly, if such remarks were made in public view
or not?
Qua the fact that if remarks were ever made, the
learned counsel for the accused persons refers to
various complaints of the complainants, which they
had filed before different authorities prior to the
filing of the present complaint, wherein there is no
mention of the caste remarks and hence, he submits
that such remarks were never made.
However, I am not inclined to accept this argument
at this stage where only a prima facie view has to be
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 4 of 20
taken. Admittedly, the complaint filed before this
Court contains the alleged caste remarks made by
the accused persons at one time or the other. Simply
because such remarks were not mentioned by the
complainants in their earlier complaints would not
be sufficient to disbelieve the complainants, who
admittedly belong to the poorer section of society.
To do so would be acting too technically. At least,
the Court needs to give the complainants an
opportunity to explain the circumstances in which
the earlier complaints were made or why such
remarks did not form part of those complaints.
Qua the second query, whether such remarks were
made in public view, I would like to refer to Daya
Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State, 2004 (2) JCC 1136,
wherein it was held that:
“The expression ‘public view’ is used in
contradistinction to the expression ‘private view’.
The view means right of vision and hearing. Public
means everybody of the public at large, i.e., the
community at large, including inhabitants of a
proper place and the people of the neighbourhood.
However, the persons having relationship or
association with the complainant are to be excluded.
‘Public view’ means within the view which includes
hearing, knowledge or accessibility also of a group
of people of the place/locality/village as distinct
from a few who are not private and are as good as
strangers and not linked with the complainant
through a close relationship or
business/commercial or other vested interest, and
who are not participating members with him in any
way.”
Though, the learned counsel for the accused
referred to Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 2297,
wherein it was observed that:
“Use of offensive words in a place not in public view
or in a place where any member of the public was
not present or where the place in which the accused
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 5 of 20
uttered the words ordinarily could not be seen by the
public, no prima facie case for the offence alleged
would be made out.”
However, the learned counsel for the complainants
also relied upon Swaran Singh (supra) to contend
that at the stage of framing of charge, only the
allegations in the complaint/FIR are required to be
considered.
Further, reliance was placed on Ghasi Ram v. NCT
of Delhi, decided on 16.08.2007 by the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi, wherein it was held:
“The question is whether the facts of this case justify
the impugned order that no charges could be
framed. Daya Bhatnagar is no doubt an authority as
to what constitutes ‘public view’. Yet, there cannot
be a blind application of the ratio in that case. Here,
the complainant had alleged humiliation by the
accused. Whether it was in public view or not is a
matter of evidence. There is nothing on record
suggestive of any commercial or family relationship
of the complainant with the witnesses; indeed it is
unknown whether they or any of them work as his
subordinates. Besides, the expression used is,
significantly enough, ‘public view’ and not ‘public
place’. In order to attract the offence, the act should
have been done by the accused in any place within
the public view and it is not necessary that such
place should be a public place. It can even be a
place which is not a public place but which would
be within the public view. Parliament evidently kept
this significant distinction in mind.
In my view, the opinion formed by the trial court that
charges ought not to be framed is premised on an
unduly narrow interpretation of Daya Bhatnagar’s
judgment. At the stage of pre-charge evidence, there
was nothing on record to show that the two
witnesses had such close nexus or proximity with the
complainant so as to be ruled out of the expression
‘public view’. Mere employment in the same office
does not disqualify a co-employee from deposing
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 6 of 20
about the veracity or otherwise of the alleged
incidents which constitute offences under the Act.”
Thus, at the stage of charge, where only a prima
facie view is to be formed, the question whether the
complainants were actually harassed in their office
premises or whether such caste remarks were ever
made cannot be decided at this stage. The
allegations, prima facie, suggest framing of charge
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act
against respondent Nos. 1 to 4.” - Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners have invoked the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 contending that the essential ingredients of the offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Act are not disclosed from the material collected during
investigation and that the order directing framing of charge is liable to be set
aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS - Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners were members of the management of Trans World Radio, whereas
respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were employed with the said organisation. She
contends that the impugned order dated 22.03.2012, whereby charges have
been framed against the petitioners under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is
legally unsustainable as no prima facie case is made out against the petitioners
and the essential ingredients of the alleged offence are conspicuously absent. - Learned Senior Counsel submits that disciplinary proceedings had been
initiated against respondent No. 2, Ram Babu, on allegations of misconduct
much prior to the filing of the present complaint. The enquiry culminated in a
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 7 of 20
finding of guilt against respondent No. 2, who was thereafter dismissed from
service. She contends that the complaint in the present case is a counterblast
to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against respondent No. 2. - She further submits that the respondents had initially lodged complaints
dated 10.01.2008 and 15.02.2008 before the SHO, Police Station Hauz Khas,
alleging that they were being compelled to convert to Christianity and were
being subjected to discrimination. Similar allegations were also made in the
complaint addressed to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. However, none of these complaints contained any
allegation regarding the use of caste-based abuses or the commission of an
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. - It is her submission that it was only in the subsequent complaint dated
29.02.2008 filed before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate that
allegations regarding caste-based remarks were introduced for the first time,
and the said allegations ultimately formed the basis for framing of charges
against the petitioners. - Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the enquiry report dated
24.03.2008 recorded findings against respondent No. 2 with regard to acts of
insubordination, indiscipline, quarrelling with colleagues, tampering with the
employer’s property, refusal to accept official communications and making
false complaints against the management. - She further contends that the status reports submitted by the SHO,
Police Station Hauz Khas, dated 03.03.2008 and 28.05.2008, did not
substantiate the allegations levelled by the respondents. She submits that a
bare reading of the statements of the respondents recorded during
investigation would also demonstrate that none of the allegations satisfy the
ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 8 of 20 - Learned Senior Counsel argues that even if the allegations contained in
the complaint are accepted at their face value, no offence under Section
3(1)(x) of the Act is made out. She submits that the complaint itself indicates
that the alleged caste-based remarks were made inside the respective offices
of the petitioners during private conversations and, therefore, the requirement
that the alleged insult or intimidation must have taken place “within public
view” is not fulfilled. - In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed upon the
decision of this Court in Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State, 109 (2004) DLT
915, to contend that the expression “public view” necessarily requires the
presence of members of the public, however few, who are independent of the
parties concerned. - She further places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710, to contend that
where the alleged incident takes place within the four walls of a building and
no member of the public is stated to be present, the essential ingredient of
“public view” is not attracted. It is submitted that the impugned order itself
records that the alleged caste remarks were made inside the offices of the
petitioners and, therefore, even on the prosecution’s own case, the statutory
requirement is not satisfied. - Learned Senior Counsel further contends that the earliest version of the
complainants assumes considerable significance. She submits that the
complaints dated 10.01.2008 and 15.02.2008, which preceded the complaint
dated 29.02.2008, do not contain any allegation of caste-based abuses.
According to her, the allegations under the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were introduced
subsequently only to fill up lacunae in the earlier version. Reliance is placed
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 9 of 20
upon the decision of this Court in Asha Aggarwal v. State, 2014 SCC OnLine
Del 1281, to contend that subsequent improvements in the prosecution case
are impermissible. - She further submits that the allegations made by the respondents are
inherently improbable. In this regard, she points out that other employees of
the organisation categorically informed the investigating agency that they had
never been subjected to any pressure to convert to Christianity, thereby
rendering the respondents’ allegations doubtful. - It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to apply the
settled principles governing framing of charge. Learned Senior Counsel
argues that where two views are possible and the material raises only a
suspicion and not a grave suspicion against the accused, the Court ought to
discharge the accused rather than frame charges. Reliance is placed upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of
Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135. - Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has further contended that
the complaint is not maintainable as it combines distinct incidents involving
different complainants and different accused persons, and that a common
complaint/common charge is impermissible in law. Reliance has been placed
on Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., (2013) 6 SCC 384. - She submits that although the learned Trial Court itself noticed
exaggerations, contradictions and improvements in the version of the
complainants, it nevertheless proceeded to frame charges on the premise that
the complainants should be afforded an opportunity to explain such
discrepancies during trial. According to her, such an approach is contrary to
the settled principles governing the stage of framing of charge.
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 10 of 20 - Lastly, learned Senior Counsel submits that the learned Trial Court
failed to accord due weight to the status reports filed by the police, which,
according to her, categorically found the allegations against the petitioners to
be unsubstantiated. She contends that in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of law and, therefore, the impugned order framing
charges deserves to be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS - Per Contra, learned APP submits that, at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is only required to examine whether a prima facie case is made out.
He contends that the question whether the alleged caste-based remarks were
made within ‘public view’ is a matter of trial. He further submits that the
earlier complaints and other material on record are matters of evidence and
can be appreciated only after the parties have led evidence before the learned
Trial Court. - The written submissions filed by Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are on record.
The same are briefly summarised as under
i. It is stated in the written submissions that the police failed to take
action against the petitioners due to their influence, leaving the
respondents, who belong to the Scheduled Caste community, with no
option but to file an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is
stated that, after dismissal of the said application, the learned
Magistrate examined the respondents under Sections 200 and 202
Cr.P.C. and summoned the petitioners for the offence under Section
3 of the SC/ST Act, and thereafter charges under Section 3(1)(x) of
the SC/ST Act were framed on 22.03.2012.
ii. It is further stated that the petitioners repeatedly pressurized the
respondents, who were permanent safai-karmacharis, to convert to
Christianity and, upon their refusal, subjected them to
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 11 of 20
discrimination, caste-based atrocities and ultimately terminated
their services while withholding their salary, gratuity, provident fund
and other service benefits. It is also stated that the respondents were
compelled to attend Bible camps and threatened with adverse
consequences if they refused to do so.
iii. It is stated that the complaint dated 29.02.2008 did not seek
prosecution only under the SC/ST Act but prayed for appropriate
action in accordance with law. It is further stated that the complaint
contains allegations attracting not only Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST
Act but also offences punishable under Sections 153A, 295A, 298,
341, 342, 506 and 34 IPC. Reliance is also placed on the
observations of the Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v.
Union of India & Ors. regarding the seriousness of forced religious
conversion.
iv. It is lastly stated that, at the stage of framing of charge, the High
Court should not undertake a detailed appreciation of evidence. It is
submitted that even if the offence under the SC/ST Act is not made
out, the allegations disclose commission of offences under the IPC.
Accordingly, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed or,
alternatively, that the charges be altered and appropriate charges
under the IPC be framed by invoking the powers under Sections 216,
221 and 482 Cr.P.C.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS - I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned APP and
considered the written submissions which are on the record. - The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the
learned Trial Court was justified in framing charge against the petitioners
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. - Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the
subsequent complaint contains material improvements over the earlier
complaints. This Court refrains from examining the said submission, as
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 12 of 20
questions relating to omissions, improvements and inconsistencies are matters
for appreciation of evidence during trial. - At the outset, this Court considers it appropriate to examine the
complaint dated 29.02.2008 filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
as it is this complaint which formed the basis for the framing of charge under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989. A perusal thereof reveals that the complainants have
narrated distinct incidents allegedly occurring on different dates and have
specifically attributed caste-based remarks to the petitioners. Relevant portion
of the said complaint is reproduced hereinunder:
“9. That in the month of August 2007 accused no. 3
told the complainant no. 2 to convey to the
complainants that hereafter they will have to take
their meals by sitting near to the toilet and when the
complainant no. 2 requested to know the reason, the
accused no. 3 got infuriated and uttered that “TUM
LOG BHANGI HO AUR TUMEH TOILET KE
PAAS HI BAITH KAR KHANA PAREGA AUR
AGAR TUM AISA NAHIN KAROGE TO
TUMEH NAUKRI SE NIKAL DIYA JAYEGA”.
Thereafter the accused persons are forced to sit
near open toilet in foul smell and are compelled to
take their meals there only. The complainants being
four persons and to save their only source of
livelihood are tolerating the same for months
together. - That in October 2007 the complainant no. 1
approached the accused no. 4 and apprised him
about the mal-treatment and harassment to them
and very humbly requested to request the
management and specially the accused persons not
to harass the complainants but to the utmost shock
and surprise the accused No. 4 started abusing the
complainants in very filthy language and said
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 13 of 20
“SAALE BAHENCHOD TERI HIMMAT KAISE
HUYI MERE PAAS AANE KI. TUM SAB
CHURE CHAMARON KO JUTE MAAR KAR
BAHAR NIKALENGE”. - That the complainants are being threatened to
be removed from their services if they do not convert
themselves to the Christians. (In order to pressurize
and create terror among the complainants. The
management of TWR-India levelled false
allegations against complainant Ram babu for
misbehaving with the seniors, and also not
performing the duties properly. A false and frivolous
inquiry was order to be conducted against
complaint Rambabu.) The complainants are having
apprehension that their services may be terminated
any time since they refused to convert their religion
from Hindu to Christian. The accused persons are
addressing the complainants most of the times as
“BHANGI KA KUTTA”. - That the complainants are being called in the
office by the said accused persons and they made to
sit for hours together and are being harassed and
pressurized to convert their religion to Christianity
against their wish. The complainants were being
subjected to perform their duties all the 7 days in a
week.” - It would be apposite to refer to the relevant statutory provision. Since
the alleged incidents pertain to the year 2007, the provisions of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, as they
stood prior to the Amendment Act, 2015, would govern the present case. It
may be noted that the offence which was then contained in Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act now substantially finds place in Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act
after the 2015 Amendment. However, as the present case relates to the pre-
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 14 of 20
amendment period, the unamended Section 3(1)(x) is applicable. The said
provision reads as under:
“Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or
intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to five years and
with fine.” - A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it evident that, to
constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the prosecution is
required to prima facie establish the following ingredients: (i) the accused is
not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; (ii) the victim is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; (iii) there is an intentional
insult or intimidation with the intent to humiliate the victim on account of his
or her caste; and (iv) such insult or intimidation takes place “in any place
within public view.” The requirement that the act must occur within public
view is a statutory ingredient of the offence and cannot be dispensed with. - The expression ‘in any place within public view’ occurring in Section
3(1)(x) of the Act has been the subject matter of judicial interpretation. This
Court deems it appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710, wherein the
Supreme Court, reiterated that the requirement of ‘public view’ is an essential
ingredient of the offence and that mere use of caste-based remarks within the
four walls of a building, in the absence of any member of the public, would
not attract the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The relevant
observations read as under:
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 15 of 20
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult
or intimidation in “any place within public view”.
What is to be regarded as “place in public view”
had come up for consideration before this Court in
the judgment reported as Swaran
Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC
435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had
drawn distinction between the expression “public
place” and “in any place within public view”. It was
held that if an offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
can be seen by someone from the road or lane
outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. On the
contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence
since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This
sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated
below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this
principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then also it would be an offence since it is
in the public view.”] . The Court held as under :
(SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
when he stood near the car which was parked at the
gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was
certainly a place within public view, since the gate
of a house is certainly a place within public view. It
could have been a different matter had the alleged
offence been committed inside a building, and also
was not in the public view. However, if the offence
is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the boundary
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 16 of 20
wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside
a building, but some members of the public are there
(not merely relatives or friends) then also it would
be an offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression “place within
public view” with the expression “public place”. A
place can be a private place but yet within the public
view. On the other hand, a public place would
ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased
by the Government or the municipality (or other
local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of
the State, and not by private persons or private
bodies.” - As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building.
It is not the case of the informant that there was any
member of the public (not merely relatives or
friends) at the time of the incident in the house.
Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were
uttered “in any place within public view” is not
made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the
charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it
could not be said that those were the persons
present within the four walls of the building. The
offence is alleged to have taken place within the four
walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the
judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran
Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC
(Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within
public view as none was said to be present within
the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or
charge-sheet.” - The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ramesh
Chandra Vaishya v. State of U.P., (2023) 17 SCC 615 wherein the Court,
while considering the scope of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, held as under:
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 17 of 20
“16. The first question that calls for an answer is
whether it was at a place within public view that the
appellant hurled caste related abuses at the
complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate
with an intent to humiliate him. From the chargesheet dated 21-1-2016 filed by the IO, it appears
that the prosecution would seek to rely on the
evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge
against the appellant of committing offences under
Sections 323 and 504IPC and Section 3(1)(x),
SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other
than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither
the first FIR nor the charge-sheet refers to the
presence of a fifth individual (a member of the
public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the
appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son).
Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant
were not “in any place within public view”, the
basic ingredient for attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the
SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold
that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of
hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by
the appellant), no member of the public was present.
Xxx - Based on the facts and circumstances of the
case, we have little hesitation in holding that even
though the appellant might have abused the
complainant but such abuse by itself and without
anything more does not warrant subjecting the
appellant to face a trial, particularly in the clear
absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of
such a degree that it could provoke a person to
break public peace or commit any other offence. - We record that the High Court misdirected itself
in failing to appreciate the challenge to the criminal
proceedings including the charge-sheet in the
proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure
of justice in rejecting such challenge.”
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 18 of 20 - Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the absence of the
statutory requirement of ‘public view’ goes to the very root of the offence
under Section 3(1)(x) and, where such ingredient is not disclosed from the
complaint or the charge-sheet, continuation of the proceedings under the said
provision cannot be sustained. - A plain reading of the complaint dated 29.02.2008 shows that the
complaint itself alleges that the caste-based remarks were made inside the
respective offices of the petitioners. Significantly, there is no averment that
any member of the public or any independent person was present at the time
of the alleged incidents. Consequently, the complaint, on its own showing,
does not prima facie disclose that the alleged insult or intimidation occurred
‘in any place within public view’, which is an essential ingredient of the
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. - It is a settled principle of law that, while considering the question of
framing of charge, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or
appreciate the evidence as if deciding the case finally. The limited enquiry at
this stage is whether the material collected during investigation, if taken at its
face value, prima facie discloses the commission of the alleged offence. At
the same time, the Court must satisfy itself that the essential ingredients of the
offence are disclosed from the complaint and the material placed on record. - While disputed questions of fact are undoubtedly matters for trial, the
Court is nevertheless required, at the stage of framing of charge, to satisfy
itself that the basic ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed from the
complaint and the material placed on record. Where the foundational
ingredients of the offence are absent from the complaint itself, an accused
cannot be compelled to face trial for such offence.
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 19 of 20 - Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court is of the considered opinion that even if the allegations contained in the
complaint dated 29.02.2008 are accepted in their entirety, the essential
statutory requirement that the alleged insult or intimidation should have taken
place ‘in any place within public view’ is not prima facie disclosed.
Consequently, the charge framed against the petitioners under Section 3(1)(x)
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION - Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
22.03.2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-02 (South),
Saket Courts, New Delhi in Sessions Case No. 42/2011 is set aside to the
extent it directs framing of charge against the petitioners under Section 3(1)(x)
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989. - The matter is remanded to the learned Trial Court for considering,
afresh and in accordance with law, the question of framing of charges, if any,
under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including the submission
regarding the maintainability of a common complaint. It is clarified that this
Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations insofar
as the offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are concerned, and the
learned Trial Court shall decide the same independently and uninfluenced by
any observations made in the present judgment. - The petitioners shall appear before the learned Trial Court on
13.08.2026. - The petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending application(s),
if any, also stand disposed of.
CRL.M.C. 2555/2012
Page 20 of 20 - Copy of this order be communicated to the concerned learned Trial
Court for necessary information and complian