W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 1 of 35
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• IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
• W.P.(C) 12156/2018 & CM APPL. 47178/2018, CM APPL.
  11959/2019, CM APPL. 7497/2024
  MOHD. UBAID …..Petitioner
  Through: Md. Azam Ansari, Advocate
  (M:9990066404)
  versus
  NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL …..Respondent
  Through: Ms. Kanika Agnihotri, SC-NDMC
  with Mr. Sachin Sharma, Advocate
  (M:9310225726)
  CORAM:
  HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
  JUDGMENT
  % 22.08.2025

1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
   Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking directions to the respondent – New
   Delhi Municipal Council (“NDMC”), to regularize the shop bearing no. 83,
   Palika Bazar, New Delhi (“subject shop”) in favour of the petitioner, and
   execute a License Deed in his favour. The petitioner further seeks quashing
   of the letters dated 18th June, 2018 and 21st December, 2011, issued by the
   respondent, thereby, rejecting the petitioner’s request for regularization.
2. Facts, as canvassed in the petition, are as follows:
   2.1 The subject shop was initially allotted to M/s Marveilleuse Arts &
   Crafts on 01
   st November, 1978, comprising of three Partners, i.e., Mohd.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 2 of 35
Shafi Wani, Mr. Gautam Mustafa Wani & Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Wani, who
subsequently, entered into a Partnership Deed with Ms. Madhu Aggarwal.
Later on, Ms. Madhu Aggarwal approached the respondent with a
Partnership Deed and a Dissolution Deed, however, the necessary
formalities for execution of the License Deed were not completed. On 25th
August, 1987, Ms. Madhu Aggarwal entered into a Partnership Deed with
Smt. Jasbir Kaur. Subsequently, a License Deed dated 08
th November, 1988
was executed in the name of Smt. Jasbir Kaur, who then, entered into a
Partnership Deed with Sh. Sanjeev Gupta on 14th December, 1993.
2.2 The respondent-NDMC executed a License Deed in favour of Sh.
Sanjeev Gupta on 01st June, 1994. As no request for renewal was made on
his behalf, consequently, on 07th November, 1998, Sh. Sanjeev Gupta was
declared as an unauthorized occupant.
2.3 Subsequently, Sh. Sanjeev Gupta was also found to have sub-let the
shop to one Mr. Abdul Rauf Javed, due to which, enhancement in license fee
was levied. Further, the respondent proceeded against Sh. Sanjeev Gupta
under Sections 5 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”), on the grounds of subletting of the public
premises, and also the determination of the License Deed by efflux of time.
Pursuant to the proceedings under the PP Act, an Eviction Order dated 24th
December, 2008, was passed by the Estate Officer, by way of which Sh.
Sanjeev Gupta was evicted, and directed to vacate the shop within 15 days.
2.4 Sh. Sanjeev Gupta challenged the Eviction Order in the Appeal
bearing no. PPA 110/09 before the District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi,
wherein, vide order dated 18th February, 2010, the appeal was dismissed, and
the Eviction Order was upheld.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 3 of 35
2.5 Thereafter, Sh. Sanjeev Gupta filed a writ petition bearing no.
W.P.(C) 1199/2010, titled as “Shri Sanjeev Gupta Versus New Delhi
Municipal Council & Anr.”, challenging the Eviction Order and the order
passed in the Appeal, i.e., PPA 110/09, wherein, vide order dated 25th
February, 2010, the Court allowed temporary possession of the shop to Sh.
Sanjeev Gupta.
2.6 During the pendency of the said writ petition, Sh. Sanjeev Gupta
entered into a partnership with the present petitioner by way of a Partnership
Deed dated 08
th September, 2010, and the same was later dissolved by way
of a Dissolution Deed dated 11th October, 2010. Thereafter, the petitioner
vide letter dated 26th October, 2010, applied with the respondent-NDMC to
get the subject shop transferred, and regularized in his name.
2.7 The writ petition bearing no. W.P.(C) 1199/2010 was dismissed as
withdrawn vide order dated 03
rd February, 2011, and the Court vacated all
interim orders, and further directed the respondent-NDMC to take
possession of the subject shop. The possession of the subject shop was taken
over by the respondent-NDMC on 10th February, 2011.
2.8 The petitioner preferred a writ petition being W.P.(C). 867/2011, titled
as “Mohd Ubaid Versus NDMC”, seeking directions to the respondentNDMC to regularize or transfer the subject shop in the name of the
petitioner, and execute a Licence Deed thereto. The said petition was
dismissed by this Court vide judgement dated 21st February, 2011, wherein,
the Court found the petitioner to have abused the process of the Court, and
held that the petitioner cannot claim any right with respect to the subject
shop.
2.9 Aggrieved by the said judgement, the petitioner filed an appeal

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 4 of 35
bearing no. LPA 450/2011, titled as “Mohd Ubaid Versus New Delhi
Municipal Council”, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court, by order
dated 12th May, 2011, directed the respondent-NDMC to consider the
representation of the petitioner, and accept or reject it, in a time-bound
manner.
2.10 After considering the representation of the petitioner, the respondentNDMC on the recommendation of the sub-committee, rejected the
application for transfer. Consequently, the respondent-NDMC issued a letter
dated 21st December, 2011, to the petitioner, rejecting the petitioner’s
request for regularization of the subject shop.
2.11 The appeal, i.e., LPA 450/2011, was dismissed as withdrawn vide
order dated 27
th April, 2012, wherein, the petitioner sought and was granted
liberty to challenge the rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011,
separately.
2.12 The petitioner sent representations dated 12th February, 2013 and 18th
December, 2013, to the respondent-NDMC for seeking transfer and
regularization of the subject shop in the petitioner’s name. However, no
decision was taken on the said representations, and therefore, being
aggrieved by the non-consideration of the representations, and the rejection
letter dated 21st December, 2011, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing
no. W.P.(C) No. 4863/2015, titled as “Ubaid Versus New Delhi Municipal
Council”. The same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 18th May,
2015, on the first date of hearing.
2.13 Thereafter, the respondent issued a new policy to grant and renew
licences of shops vide Circular no. D-1043/SO(Estate-I)/2016, dated 16th
August, 2016. The petitioner filed a fresh representation with the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 5 of 35
respondent-NDMC for regularization of the subject shop by letter dated 12th
October, 2016, based on the Circular dated 16th August, 2016.
2.14 Vide letter dated 18th June, 2018, the respondent-NDMC replied to the
fresh representation of the petitioner, thereby, clarifying the status of the
subject shop, and informing that the possession of the subject shop has been
taken over by the NDMC.
2.15 The petitioner filed another representation dated 18th September,
2018, based on the Circular dated 16th August, 2016.
2.16 Being aggrieved by the said communication dated 18
th June, 2018 and
the rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011, the petitioner filed the present
writ petition seeking regularization, and issuance of a license with regard the
subject shop in favour of the petitioner.

3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted as follows:
   3.1 The letter dated 21st December, 2011, rejecting the request for
   regularization, is cryptic and violative of Principles of Natural Justice. The
   respondent-NDMC failed to apply its Resolution, titled “Estate Policy/
   Guidelines for Declaring with Estate Matters” dated 18th March, 1999, and
   the Resolution titled “Policy Regarding Cases in Which Eviction and
   Recovery Orders Have Been Passed” dated 30th December, 1997. Thus, the
   letter dated 21st December, 2011, should be set aside for non-application of
   mind.
   3.2 The letter dated 18th June, 2018, by which the representation of the
   petitioner for regularization of the subject shop was again rejected by the
   respondent-NDMC, also failed to apply the Circular dated 16th August,
   2016.
   3.3 The respondent, being a “state” under Article 12 of the Constitution of

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India, must apply its resolutions uniformly, without discriminating between
the applicants. The respondent-NDMC has regularized the shops of similarly
placed persons, against whom eviction notices were issued, either on its own
or upon intervention by the Court. Thus, the subject shop of the petitioner
should also be regularized under the resolutions of the respondent-NDMC,
on the grounds of parity and uniform application of policy.
3.4 The decision of the respondent to reject the application of the
petitioner was in contravention of the legal opinion given by the Standing
Counsel, Special Counsel and Law Department of the respondent-NDMC.
3.5 In the writ petition bearing no. W.P.(C) 1199/2010, titled “Shri
Sanjeev Gupta Versus New Delhi Municipal Council & Anr.”, this Court, by
order dated 25th February, 2010, permitted Sh. Sanjeev Gupta (petitioner
therein) to use and occupy the subject shop, upon depositing the entire
arrears of the license fee, along with the subletting charges from February,
1999 onwards. Thereafter, the respondent-NDMC demanded a payment of
Rs. 17,18,590.13/- as arrears from February, 1999 till 22nd February, 2010,
by letter dated 05
th March, 2010. The aforesaid demand was duly paid by the
present petitioner, and the subject shop was de-sealed. However, despite
clearing the dues of the last 11 years, the subject shop was again sealed by
the respondent-NDMC on 10th February 2011, as the writ petition bearing
no. W.P.(C) 1199/2010 was dismissed as withdrawn, and possession was
granted to the respondent-NDMC by the order of the Court dated 03
rd
February, 2011. The subject shop has remained in the possession of the
respondent-NDMC for the last one and a half decades. The sealing of the
subject shop violates the petitioner’s “Right to Livelihood”, protected under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 7 of 35

4. On behalf of the respondent-NDMC, it is submitted as follows:
   4.1 The present writ is not maintainable as it is barred by delay and
   laches. The application of the petitioner seeking regularization already
   stands rejected, in absolute terms, by the letter dated 21st December, 2011.
   Despite this, the petitioner persistently sent representations for
   regularization, because of which the letter dated 18th June, 2018, was issued
   by the respondent-NDMC to merely clarify the existing situation that the
   respondent had taken possession over the subject shop. The letter dated 18th
   June, 2018, being merely clarificatory in nature, cannot be considered to
   give rise to a fresh cause of action.
   4.2 The writ petition is not maintainable as the same is barred by res
   judicata. This Court, while deciding the writ petition being W.P.(C)
   867/2011, titled as “Mohd Ubaid Versus NDMC”, passed the judgement
   dated 21st February, 2011, wherein, the Court held that the petitioner was not
   entitled to any treatment in parity. This is because the subject shop had gone
   much beyond the stage of termination of the License Deed, an Eviction
   Order had been passed, appeal against the Eviction Order had been
   dismissed, and possession was taken over. The Eviction Order attained
   finality, and the petitioner could not claim any right in the subject shop,
   when the person, through whom the petitioner claims his right, stood
   evicted. The Court, vide order dated 21st February, 2011 in the aforesaid
   writ, also noted that the petition was an abuse of the process of the Court
   and dismissed the writ petition. In view of the order dated 21st February,
   2011, the petitioner is barred by res judicata from raising the same relief,
   and from raising new pleas for the same old relief.
   4.3 On merits, the claim of the petitioner has to be rejected. The Eviction

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Order dated 24th December, 2008, passed by the Estate Officer against Sh.
Sanjeev Gupta has attained finality. Therefore, Sh. Sanjeev Gupta stood
divested of all the rights in the subject shop, and had no legal right to
effectuate any transfer in favour of the petitioner by the Partnership Deed
dated 08
th September, 2010. Thus, no right in the subject shop has accrued in
favour of the present petitioner.
4.4 Additionally, the Circular dated 16th August, 2016, is only applicable
to pending cases of transfer of license. Since the application of the petitioner
for regularization of the subject shop was rejected in 2011 itself, with
finality, the petitioner’s case cannot be regarded as being “pending”, and the
said Circular does not apply to the petitioner.

5. I have heard learned counsels for the parties, and have perused the
   record.
6. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for
   regularization of the subject shop, and consequently, for the respondentNDMC to issue a license in favour of the petitioner towards the same.
7. As per the facts on record, the subject shop was initially allotted to a
   partnership firm, i.e., M/s Marveilleuse Arts and Crafts on 01
   st November,
8. Thereafter, one Ms. Madhu Aggarwal became a partner of the said
   firm. She submitted documents with the NDMC related to Partnership Deed
   and subsequent dissolution of partnership by way of a Dissolution Deed, but
   failed to complete the necessary formalities for execution of License Deed in
   her favour.
9. The said Ms. Madhu Aggarwal, then entered into a Partnership Deed
   with Smt. Jasbir Kaur and a License Deed was executed in her name for a
   period of five years starting from 08th November, 1988, who on 14th

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 9 of 35
December, 1993, executed a Partnership Deed with Sh. Sanjeev Gupta, i.e.,
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, in favour of whom the respondentNDMC granted license for the subject shop on 01st June, 1994.

9. It is undisputed that on account of non-renewal of the License, Sh.
   Sanjeev Gupta was declared an unauthorized occupant on 07th November,
10. Furthermore, as it was found that the subject shop was sub-let by Sh.
    Sanjeev Gupta to one Mr. Abdul Rauf Javed, in contravention to the Terms
    of the License, the respondent-NDMC initiated eviction proceedings under
    Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act against Sh. Sanjeev Gupta. Pursuant thereto,
    an Eviction Order dated 24th December, 2008, was passed by the Estate
    Officer.
11. The said Eviction Order was challenged by Sh. Sanjeev Gupta,
    predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein, before the District Judge, Tis
    Hazari Courts, New Delhi by way of appeal bearing no. PPA/110/09,
    wherein, vide order dated 18th February, 2010, the appeal was dismissed, and
    the Eviction Order was upheld. Thereafter, the order dated 18th February,
    2010, along with the Eviction Order dated 24th December, 2008, was
    challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) 1199/2010 by Sh. Sanjeev Gupta.
12. It is pertinent to note that during the course of the said writ petition,
    Sh. Sanjeev Gupta executed a Partnership Deed dated 08th September, 2010,
    with the petitioner herein, and within just a span of a month, the said parties
    executed a Dissolution Deed dated 11th October, 2010, upon which, the
    petitioner herein sought to claim the right to have the shop licensed in his
    favour by the respondent-NDMC, by way of a representation dated 26th
    October, 2010.
13. It is also pertinent to note that the Court in W.P.(C) 1199/2010, had

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 10 of 35
passed several orders, wherein, it was indicated that the identity of Sh.
Sanjeev Gupta was in doubt, and directed Sh. Sanjeev Gupta to produce
documents in this regard. However, vide order dated 03rd February, 2011,
Sh. Sanjeev Gupta withdrew the said writ petition, which was allowed to be
withdrawn by the Court with imposition of costs, and direction to the
respondent-NDMC to take possession of the subject shop. Accordingly, the
possession of the subject shop was taken by the respondent-NDMC, on 10th
February, 2011. The order dated 03rd February, 2011, passed in
W.P.(C)1199/2010, is reproduced as under:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to withdraw the present
petition.
Dismissed as withdrawn with costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be deposited by
the petitioner with the Delhi High Court Bar Association Lawyers
Social Security and Welfare Fund within two weeks from the date of
this order. Let the respondent take possession of the subject shop
forthwith.
All interim orders passed in this matter stand vacated.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

13. The aforesaid facts clearly show that the Eviction Order dated 24th
    December, 2008, passed by the Estate Officer and upheld vide order dated
    18th February, 2010, in the appeal, against Sh. Sanjeev Gupta, predecessorin-interest of the petitioner, has attained finality. Thus, the operation of the
    Eviction Order against Sh. Sanjeev Gupta was effective from 24th
    December, 2008, when the Eviction Order was initially passed by the Estate
    Officer. Thus, when Sh. Sanjeev Gupta entered into Partnership Deed with
    the petitioner herein, on 08th September, 2010, he had no right, title or
    interest over the property in question.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 11 of 35

14. It is to be noted that at the time when Sh. Sanjeev Gupta entered into
    Partnership Deed with the petitioner herein, he had merely been permitted
    by this Court in W.P.(C) 1199/2010, vide order dated 25th February, 2010, to
    use and occupy the subject shop, as an interim measure. Thus, when the
    said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, the interim measure in favour
    of Sh. Sanjeev Gupta was vacated. Consequently, upon withdrawal of the
    said writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C) 1199/2010, challenging the Eviction Order,
    the Eviction Order against Sh. Sanjeev Gupta became effective and attained
    finality. Thus, any transaction qua the subject shop entered by Sh. Sanjeev
    Gupta, after Eviction Order dated 24th December, 2008, was non-est and had
    no recognition in the eyes of law. When the said Sh. Sanjeev Gupta himself
    had no right, title or interest over the subject shop, he could not have
    transferred any right, title or interest to the present petitioner by way of the
    Partnership Deed. Law in this regard is settled that no one can transfer a
    better title than what he himself has. Thus, in the absence of any title in
    favour of Sh. Sanjeev Gupta, he could not have transferred any title, right or
    interest in favour of the petitioner herein.
15. At this stage, it is to be noted that the petitioner herein has averred
    that he had paid the dues against the arrears of license fees for the subject
    shop to the tune of Rs. 17,18,590.13/-, from February 1999 till 22nd
    February, 2010. On the basis of the Partnership Deed, and payment of the
    arrears of license fees for the subject shop, the petitioner further filed a writ
    petition bearing no. W.P.(C) 867/2011, seeking regularization and execution
    of a License Deed in his favour.
16. The said writ petition, W.P.(C) 867/2011, was dismissed by way of
    judgement dated 21st February, 2011, wherein, the Court held that the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 12 of 35
eviction of Sh. Sanjeev Gupta had attained finality, and Sh. Sanjeev Gupta
had no right whatsoever to transfer the possession of the subject shop, and
that the petitioner herein could not have acquired any title from Sh. Sanjeev
Gupta. The aforesaid writ petition filed by the petitioner herein, was
dismissed in the following manner:
“xxx xxx xxx

9. This petition has been filed pleading that Shri Sanjeev Gupta had
   on 8th September, 2010 i.e. after 25th February, 2010 vide interim
   order of which date Shri Sanjeev Gupta was permitted to use and
   occupy the shop had for consideration transferred the possession of
   the shop to the petitioner herein by executing a Partnership Deed
   and Dissolution Deed in quick succession. It is further claimed that
   the respondent NDMC has a Policy for transferring and
   regularizing shops which had been illegally sublet; direction for
   regularizing the transfer of the shop by Shri Sanjeev Gupta in
   favour of the petitioner herein is sought. Though the earlier writ
   petition and the order dated 25th February, 2010 therein is disclosed
   but it is pleaded that since Shri Sanjeev Gupta after transfer had lost
   interest in the writ petition filed by him he had withdrawn the same.
   Neither were the further orders in the said writ petition whereby this
   Court had expressed doubts as to the identity of Shri Sanjeev Gupta
   and as to the abuse of the process of the Court were disclosed nor
   was it disclosed that this Court while dismissing the writ petition as
   withdrawn had also directed NDMC to takeover possession of the
   shop.
10. Not only is it contention of the counsel for the respondent NDMC
    that the Advocates representing Shri Sanjeev Gupta and the petitioner
    herein are the same but it is also stated that Shri Abdul Rauf Javed
    who was pursuing the earlier writ petition as the attorney of Shri
    Sanjeev Gupta is closely related to the petitioner herein. The senior
    counsel for the petitioner appearing today has fairly admitted so.
    From the same also, a case of concealment having been practiced by
    the petitioner is made out. It is well settled that a party indulging in
    abuse of the process of the Court and in concealment of facts from this
    Court is not entitled to invoke the discretionary remedy under Article
    226 of the Constitution of India.
11. The senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that the
    petitioner herein cannot be accused of concealment, having

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 13 of 35
disclosed the factum of earlier writ petition. I am unable to agree.
Partial disclosure or disclosure to the extent that does not hurt the
litigant is no excuse. What was required to be informed was that the
petition in the name of Shri Sanjeev Gupta was being pursued by a
close relative (brother-in-law) of the petitioner and that serious
doubts had been cast therein with respect to the very identity of Shri
Sanjeev Gupta and of the genuineness of the documents produced in
that Court. It was also required to be disclosed that the Court in the
earlier writ petition had directed the respondent NDMC to takeover
possession. On the contrary an attempt was made to have the said
direction in the earlier writ petition nullified by obtaining a
contradictory order from a Co-ordinate Bench. The senior counsel for
the petitioner of course contends that till the filing of the present
petition, the copy of the order dated 3rd February, 2011 in the earlier
writ petition had not been obtained. Even if that be so, the order dated
3
rd February, 2011 in the earlier writ petition directing the respondent
NDMC to takeover possession was made in the presence of the
counsels then appearing and who appeared before this Court also in
the present writ petition on 10th February, 2011 and there was no
reason for concealing the said fact. Such practices are but to be
deprecated and disentitle the petitioner from any hearing.

12. I had on 10th February, 2011 also enquired from the petitioner
    as to how the petitioner could base his case on transfer of the shop
    by Shri Sanjeev Gupta when Shri Sanjeev Gupta himself was
    custodia legis i.e. in use of the shop under orders in the earlier writ
    petition. The said use permitted to him was under the control of the
    Court and he could not have transferred the possession of the shop
    to the petitioner herein as claimed.
13. The senior counsel for the petitioner has today argued that there is
    nothing in the order dated 25th February, 2010 in the earlier writ
    petition to suggest that Shri Sanjeev Gupta was put into possession of
    the shop on that date as a receiver or that the shop was in custodia
    legis.
14. Merely because such words have not been used in the order
    cannot change the position as emerging from the records. An order
    of eviction had been passed against Shri Sanjeev Gupta and the
    appeal of Shri Sanjeev Gupta thereagainst been dismissed. The
    possession of the shop was taken over by the respondent NDMC
    thereafter and in execution of the order of eviction. The petitioner
    Shri Sanjeev Gupta had claimed the interim relief of being put into
    possession during the pendency of the said earlier petition and
    which was granted. Such possession could be nothing but under

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 14 of 35
directions of the Court. Thus Shri Sanjeev Gupta had no right
whatsoever to transfer the possession of the shop and the petitioner
who atleast admits knowledge of the order dated 25th February, 2010
in the earlier writ petition could not have acquired any title from
Shri Sanjeev Gupta.

15. The senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that the
    petitioner cannot be deprived of the right under the Policy of the
    respondent NDMC regularizing unauthorized transfers. However in
    the present case the transfer of title claimed by the petitioner is of a
    date after the right and title if any in favour of Shri Sanjeev Gupta
    stood extinguished by the eviction order and by execution thereof.
    There was thus nothing to which the petitioner could have acquired
    title.
16. The senior counsel for the petitioner has next argued that the
    petitioner has paid over ₹17.8 lacs as consideration for the said shop
    and is willing to pay to the respondent NDMC all charges also for
    transfer and the respondent NDMC will not suffer any loss if transfer
    in favour of the petitioner is regularized. The counsel for the
    respondent NDMC on the contrary has argued that the shop will be
    put to public auction.
17. In the face of doubt as to the identity of Shri Sanjeev Gupta, the
    version of the petitioner of having paid ₹17.8 lacs to Shri Sanjeev
    Gupta cannot be believed. Rather what appears is that the shop had
    been sublet, assigned or illegally parted with possession of much prior
    to the initiation of the proceedings under the PP Act against Shri
    Sanjeev Gupta. However instead of availing of the Policy aforesaid at
    that stage, the eviction proceedings were contested tooth and nail and
    on false grounds of the shop having not been sublet, assigned or
    parted with possession. It appears that it was the petitioner only who
    was contesting the earlier proceedings also including proceedings
    before the Estate Officer. Though the senior counsel for the petitioner
    has urged that Shri Abdul Rauf Javed is different from the petitioner
    but there is nothing to explain as to why the Power of Attorney in
    favour of Shri Abdul Rauf Javed was executed when it was the
    petitioner who had been transferred the shop. Normally such power of
    attorney are executed as part of transfer and there is no reason for me
    to believe that it was not so in the present case also.
18. There is yet another aspect. It is disclosed that an application for
    transfer was made to the respondent NDMC on 26th October, 2010
    i.e. when the earlier writ petition was still pending. Even then it was
    not disclosed in the earlier writ petition that an application for
    transfer had been made. When the deceit and falsehood in the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 15 of 35
earlier writ petition was caught, the same was conveniently
withdrawn and this second round commenced.

19. The senior counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention to the
    paper book where it is pleaded that benefit of the Policy has been
    given even in cases where license of the shop had been terminated.
    It is contended that the petitioner is to be treated at par. The shop
    subject matter of the present petition had however gone much
    beyond the stage of termination of license; eviction order had been
    passed, appeal dismissed and possession taken over. The writ
    petition preferred by Shri Sanjeev Gupta against the order of
    eviction was withdrawn. The said order of eviction has now attained
    finality. The petitioner cannot claim any right with respect to a shop
    from which the person through whom petitioner claims right stood
    evicted. The petitioner thus cannot claim parity with those cases.
20. The present petition is found to be a continuation of abuse of the
    process of the Court noticed in the earlier writ petition and is
    dismissed. I refrain from imposing any costs.”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
21. Against the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner herein preferred an
    appeal bearing no. LPA 450/2011, wherein, the Division Bench of this Court
    vide order dated 12th May, 2011, without entering into the merits of the
    dispute, directed the respondent to decide the representation of the
    petitioner, earlier submitted with the respondent. The order dated 12th May,
    2011, passed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 450/2011, reads as under:
    “Heard Mr. Arvind Nigam, learned senior counsel with Mr. Sanjay
    Kr. Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Nilava
    Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondent/NDMC. In course of
    hearing of the appeal Mr. Nigam submitted that the appellant has
    filed an application for consideration by the NDMC and that should
    be considered in accordance with the policy of the NDMC. Without
    expressing any opinion on any of the aspects, we only direct NDMC
    to consider the representation and accept or reject the same within
    four weeks from the date of receipt of the order passed today.
    We repeat at the cost of repetition that all grounds are available to the
    NDMC to deal with the application within four weeks.
    When we have directed for consideration it shall not be construed that

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 16 of 35
there has been direction by this Court for initiating the process of
auction, if NDMC so advised.
After the decision is communicated to the petitioner the matter be
listed on 4th July, 2011.”

18. Thus, it is manifest that though the Division Bench directed that the
    representation of the petitioner herein be considered, however, the findings
    in the writ petition, W.P.(C) 867/2011, vide judgment dated 21st February,
    2011, were not disturbed. Thus, the findings that Sh. Sanjeev Gupta himself
    being custodia legis, i.e., in use of the subject shop under orders in the
    earlier writ petition, and could not have transferred the possession of the
    shop to the petitioner, attained finality. It was established that when the title
    of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein, stood extinguished by
    the Eviction Order, there was nothing to which the petitioner could have
    acquired title. Further, the finding by this Court in W.P.(C) 867/2011, that
    the petitioner cannot claim any right with respect to a shop from which the
    person, through whom the petitioner claims the right, stood evicted, also
    attained finality. Thus, it is undisputed that the petitioner did not acquire any
    right from his predecessor-in-interest, since the right of his predecessor-ininterest, was extinguished upon passing of the Eviction Order against him,
    legality of which order has been sustained, and has not been set aside.
19. Upon the directions of the Division Bench, as aforesaid, the
    respondent-NDMC considered the representation of the petitioner, and by
    way of rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011, rejected the
    representation of the petitioner for regularization. The rejection letter dated
    21st December, 2011, is reproduced as under:
    “xxx xxx xxx

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 17 of 35
xxx xxx xxx”

20. Pursuant to the said rejection, the petitioner herein, i.e., appellant in
    the aforesaid appeal, sought to withdraw the appeal, with liberty to challenge
    the rejection letter separately, and the same was allowed vide order dated
    27th April, 2012, in the following manner:
    “The learned counsel for the appellant seeks permission to withdraw
    this appeal in view of the fact that a subsequent order has been
    passed by the NDMC on 21.02.2011 and that he would be

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 18 of 35
challenging that order separately.
Dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

21. Instead of challenging the aforesaid rejection letter dated 21st
    December, 2011, in terms of the liberty taken from the Division Bench, the
    petitioner sent further representations dated 12th February, 2013 and 18th
    December, 2013, to the respondent, seeking regularization of the subject
    shop. However, on account of no reply on behalf of the respondent-NDMC,
    the petitioner filed another writ petition bearing no. W.P.(C) 4863/2015,
    which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 18th May, 2015, on the
    first date of hearing, after some arguments. The order dated 18th May, 2015,
    passed in W.P.(C) 4863/2015, reads as under:
    “CM APPL. No. 8793/2015 (Exemption)
    Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
    The application stands disposed of.
    W.P.(C) 4863/2015 & CM APPL. No. 8794/2015 (stay)
    After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks
    to withdraw this petition. The petition and the application are
    dismissed as withdrawn.”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
22. Subsequently, the petitioner, by taking shelter under the new policy of
    the respondent-NDMC, issued by way of Circular dated 16th August, 2016,
    for transfer and renewal of license of shops, again sent a representation
    dated 12th October, 2016, seeking regularization of the subject shop in his
    favour. By way of letter dated 18th June, 2018, the respondent-NDMC
    clarified the status of the shop, thereby, communicating that the subject shop
    was in possession of the respondent-NDMC, and that the eviction of Sh.
    Sanjeev Gupta, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, had attained
    finality. The letter dated 18th June, 2018, is reproduced as under:

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 19 of 35
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”

23. The petitioner again filed a representation dated 18th September, 2018,
    and thereafter, filed the present writ petition seeking regularization and
    issuance of license in relation to the subject shop in favour of the petitioner.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 20 of 35

24. Taking into account the aforementioned facts and the conduct of the
    petitioner in relation to filing subsequent representations, despite his earlier
    representation having been rejected by the respondent-NDMC vide letter
    dated 21st December, 2011, it is evident that the petitioner has agitated and
    re-agitated the substantial prayer of seeking regularization time and again,
    by way of several petitions before this Court.
25. It is noted that the petitioner, despite receiving a liberty vide order
    dated 27th April, 2012, to challenge the rejection letter, again sent
    representations to the respondent dated 12th February, 2013 and 18th
    December, 2013, for regularization of the shop in his favour. The petitioner
    despite having the opportunity to challenge the rejection letter by the
    respondent in 2012, when the aforesaid liberty was granted by the Division
    Bench, chose to again file representations with similar prayers as was
    already decided by the respondent, which was also the basis for withdrawal
    of the appeal, LPA No. 450/2011, before the Division Bench, vide order
    dated 27th April, 2012.
26. Furthermore, as noted above, the petitioner, in 2015 had filed another
    writ petition, i.e, W.P.(C) 4863/2015, being aggrieved by the fact that the
    subsequent representations submitted by him had not being decided, and
    also challenged the rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011, which was
    again withdrawn by the petitioner on the first date of hearing itself, vide
    order dated 18th May, 2015.
27. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner has resorted to filing
    representations time and again, despite the fact that the finding against the
    petitioner has attained finality, wherein, this Court in W.P.(C) 867/2011,
    vide judgment dated 21st February, 2011, has categorically held that after the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 21 of 35
eviction of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, the said predecessorin-interest of the petitioner did not have any title or interest left in him qua
the shop in question, which could been transferred in favour of the petitioner
herein. The mere fact that the Division Bench of this Court in LPA
450/2011, had granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the rejection
letter issued by the respondent-NDMC separately, would not imply that the
interest of the petitioner in the shop in question stood revived, when he had
no interest in the shop ever. Even otherwise, the pending representation of
the petitioner which was considered pursuant to directions issued by the
Division Bench stood rejected way back vide letter dated 21st December,
2011, which is also sought to be challenged belatedly in the present writ
petition.

28. Thus, it is evident that the findings against the petitioner having no
    right or title over the shop in question, in view of the fact that his
    predecessor-in-interest himself had no right or title over the shop in question
    at the time of entering into the Partnership Deed with the petitioner herein,
    has attained finality in view of the judgment dated 21st February, 2011,
    passed in W.P.(C) 867/2011. The said findings still hold the field and have
    not been set aside in the appellate proceedings initiated by the petitioner in
    LPA 450/2011. Thus, the findings against the petitioner, having become
    conclusive and final, the present petition is barred by the Principles of
    Constructive Res Judicata. The petitioner’s attempt to re-argue the case,
    which has already been finally decided, is clearly a misuse and abuse of the
    process of law. Thus, Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana
    Versus State of Karnataka and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 408, has held as
    follows:

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 22 of 35
“xxx xxx xxx

18. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in breach of
    the principle of res judicata is prima facie a proceeding which has
    been initiated in abuse of the process of court.
19. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Devilal Modi v. STO [AIR
    1965 SC 1150], has explained this principle in very clear terms: (AIR
    p. 1152, para 7)
    “7. … But the question as to whether a citizen should be allowed to
    challenge the validity of the same order by successive petitions
    under Article 226, cannot be answered merely in the light of the
    significance and importance of the citizens’ fundamental rights.
    The general principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is
    ultimately based on considerations of public policy. One
    important consideration of public policy is that the decisions
    pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final,
    unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and
    the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same
    kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be
    contrary to considerations of fair play and justice
    (vide Daryao v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1 SCR
    574] ).”
20. This Court in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] explained in clear
    terms that principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent
    an abuse of the process of court. In explaining the said principle the
    Bench in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] relied on the following
    formulation of Somervell, L.J. in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All
    ER 255 (CA)] (All ER p. 257 H): (AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] ,
    SCC p. 700, para 39)
    “39. … „I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would
    be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not
    confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide,
    but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the
    subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been
    raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to
    allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.‟ ”
    (emphasis supplied in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] )
    The Bench in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] also noted that the
    judgment of the Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER 255
    (CA)] was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab
    Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 362] , SCC at p. 809,

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 23 of 35
para 4.

21. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of this Court
    in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State of
    Maharashtra [(1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : (1990) 13
    ATC 348] laid down the following principle: (SCC p. 741, para 35)
    “35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the
    actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the
    parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as
    incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the
    litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of
    the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and
    defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata
    underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the
    writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.”
22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution
    Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of
    constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section
    11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions.
23. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been finally
    decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the
    court, regardless of the principles of res judicata, as has been held by
    this Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573]. In SCC
    para 44 of the Report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed
    by this Court and the relevant portions whereof are extracted below:
    (SCC p. 592)
    “44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the
    court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and
    contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the
    same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier
    against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res
    judicata.”
24. In coming to the aforementioned finding, this Court relied on The
    Supreme Court Practice, 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell (p.
    344). The relevant principles laid down in the aforesaid practice and
    which have been accepted by this Court are as follows: (K.K. Modi
    case [(1998) 3 SCC 573], SCC p. 592, para 43)
    “43. … „This term connotes that the process of the court must be
    used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 24 of 35
will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper
case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a
means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. …
The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious
or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the
relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of
public policy and the interests of justice may be very material.‟ ”

25. On the premises aforesaid, it is clear that the attempt by the
    appellant to reagitate the same issues which were considered by this
    Court and were rejected expressly in the previous judgment
    in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683], is a clear instance of an abuse of
    process of this Court apart from the fact that such issues are barred
    by principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata and
    principles analogous thereto.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
26. By taking advantage of the liberty granted by the Division Bench, the
    petitioner cannot resort to making similar representations time and again,
    when the earlier pending representation of the petitioner that was considered
    pursuant to the order of the Division Bench, already stood rejected. As noted
    above, the petitioner withdrew the appeal, LPA 450/2011, vide order dated
    27th April, 2012, with liberty to challenge the rejection of the representation
    vide letter dated 21st December, 2011, by the respondent-NDMC. However,
    taking benefit of the said order passed by the Division Bench, the petitioner
    cannot seek to file numerous representations when the earlier pending
    representation considered by the respondent-NDMC as per direction of the
    Division Bench, had already been rejected. This is abuse and misuse of the
    process, as there was no liberty from the Division Bench to file innumerable
    representations later, when the earlier pending representation had been
    rejected. Rather, the appeal before the Division Bench was dismissed as
    withdrawn to only challenge the letter by which the representation of the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 25 of 35
petitioner had already been rejected by the respondent-NDMC.

30. As noted above, the present petition is evidently barred by res
    judicata, as the issue at hand, which is regularization and issuance of license
    in relation to the subject shop in favour of the petitioner, has already been
    dealt by this Court vide judgement dated 21st February, 2011, which findings
    have not been interfered with, and have accordingly attained finality. The
    principles of res judicata apply to writ proceedings, as held by the Supreme
    Court in the case of Raghavendra Rao and Others Versus State of
    Karnataka and Others, (2009) 4 SCC 635, wherein, it has been held as
    under:
    “xxx xxx xxx
31. As noticed hereinbefore, leave had been granted to avail any other
    remedy available only to those petitioners who had not been paid their
    salary for the period during which they worked as Accountants. The
    claim of the appellants is, thus, barred under the principles of res
    judicata/constructive res judicata, the earlier judgment having
    attained finality. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
    principle of res judicata applies also to the writ proceedings.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
32. The present writ petition has been filed seeking to set aside the letter
    dated 21st December, 2011, by which the earlier pending representation of
    the petitioner that was considered by the respondent-NDMC pursuant to
    directions issued by the Division Bench, was rejected. Despite, rejection of
    the representation of the petitioner vide the aforesaid letter, the petitioner
    continued making representations to the NDMC. Thus, vide letter dated 18th
    June, 2018, the respondent-NDMC clarified about the status of the shop in
    question, which letter has also been impugned by way of the present writ
    petition.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 26 of 35

32. The petitioner has taken the aforesaid letter of 2018 as a cause of
    action, and filed the present writ petition, challenging the said clarificatory
    letter dated 18th June, 2018 and the rejection letter dated 21st December,
33. It is to be noted that any cause of action that may have arisen in favour
    of the petitioner, has arisen from the date of the first representation of the
    petitioner, i.e., 26th October, 2010. No fresh cause of action can be said to
    have arisen in favour of the petitioner from the date of the rejection letter
    dated 18th June, 2018, issued by the respondent. Further, no fresh cause of
    action can be said to have arisen in favour of the petitioner from the date
    when the liberty was granted by the Division Bench to challenge the said
    rejection letter. Further, fresh cause of action cannot also be said to have
    arisen in favour of the petitioner from the date of any further representations
    filed by the petitioner or the consequent clarification of the respondent with
    regard the subject shop. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the
    judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others
    Versus M. K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, wherein, it has been categorically
    held that a direction to consider a representation and a decision in
    compliance thereof, will not create a new cause of action, and the aspect of
    delay has to be seen from the original cause of action. Thus, it has been held
    as follows:
    “xxx xxx xxx
34. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead”
    issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a
    direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision
    cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for
    reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of
    limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to
    the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on
    which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction.

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 27 of 35
Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued
without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance
with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and
laches.

16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or
    representation should examine whether the claim or representation is
    with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a
    “dead” or “stale” issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale”
    issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter
    and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or
    tribunal deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining
    the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be
    without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay
    and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be
    the legal position and effect.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
17. As discussed above, the issue with regard to eviction in relation to the
    subject shop was dealt with by way of judgement dated 21st February, 2011
    in W.P.(C) 867/2011, wherein, this Court recognised the fact of eviction of
    predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, i.e., Sh. Sanjeev Gupta in
    categorical terms, and dismissed the claim of the petitioner for regularization
    of the subject shop. In the aforesaid judgement, it has been held that the
    petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, i.e., Sh. Sanjeev Gupta, did not have an
    effective title and stood divested of all rights in the subject shop in view of
    the Eviction Order against him. When the predecessor-in-interest of the
    petitioner himself, by virtue of the Eviction Order having attained finality,
    did not have an interest to transfer, in that case, no right accrued in favour of
    the petitioner from Sh. Sanjeev Gupta, as the said Sh. Sanjeev Gupta,
    predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, was himself divested of all interest
    in relation to the subject shop.
18. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi Nambiar Versus

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 28 of 35
Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese, (2022) 7 SCC 90, while holding
that no one can confer a better title than what he himself has, held as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx

19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that “no
    one can confer a better title than what he himself has” (Nemo dat quod non
    habet). The Appellant’s sister did not have the power to sell the property to
    the vendors of the Respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the Respondent
    could not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the
    Respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to
    the Respondent, except perhaps the litigation.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
20. Furthermore, it is manifest that the petitioner made the same prayer
    for regularization in the earlier writ petitions, as has been made in the
    present writ petition. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view, that the
    prayer of the petitioner for regularization of the subject shop in his favour, is
    a misuse and abuse of the process of law as the finding against him in this
    regard, had attained finality when the representation of the petitioner was
    rejected vide letter dated 21st December, 2011. Further, the various issues
    raised by the petitioner time and again, including, in the present writ petition
    for regularization of the shop in question in the name of the petitioner, were
    settled by this Court vide its judgement dated 21st February, 2011, which
    was not interfered with by the Appellate Court, and has no existing
    challenge against it.
21. Furthermore, the present petition largely suffers from delay and
    latches. Consequent to the rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011, which
    was passed pursuant to the directions issued by the Division Bench vide
    order dated 12th May, 2011 in LPA/450/2011, the petitioner withdrew the

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 29 of 35
said appeal vide order dated 27th April, 2012, with liberty granted to the
petitioner to challenge the rejection letter separately. However, the challenge
of the petitioner to the said rejection letter first came in writ petition filed in
2015, i.e., W.P.(C) 4863/2015 which was also withdrawn on the first date
itself. Despite the same, the petitioner has again re-agitated the said
challenge to the rejection letter dated 21st December, 2011, by way of the
present petition which was filed in 2018.

37. There is no cogent reason presented by the petitioner with regard to
    the delay in challenging the rejection letter of the year 2011, despite
    receiving liberty to do the same, by the Division Bench of this Court. Even
    if the subsequent proceedings before this Court are taken into account,
    nevertheless, on account of the said proceedings being withdrawn and the
    judgement dated 21st February, 2011, attaining finality, the present petition
    suffers from delay and laches. The petitioner, to surpass this hurdle of delay,
    has time and again attempted to revive the cause of action by way of
    repeated representations. This course of action of the petitioner, cannot be
    accepted, or allowed. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the case of
    Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others.
    Versus T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, while holding that delay and
    laches should not be lightly brushed aside in writ petitions, has held as
    follows:
    “xxx xxx xxx
38. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra
    SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329] the Court
    referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock
    in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd,
    (1874) LR 5 PC 221], which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor
    Service case [AIR 1969 SC 329] , AIR pp. 335-36, para 11)

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 30 of 35
“11. … „Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has,
by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect
he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in, either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would
be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy.‟ (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case [Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221] , PC pp. 239-40)”
xxx xxx xxx

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
    brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
    offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
    mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
    jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
    rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
    primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate
    reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the
    court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at
    a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes
    in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may
    not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only
    invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court.
    Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a
    litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination
    is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to
    sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes
    injury to the lis.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
17. This Court also rejects the premise that any fresh cause of action may
    have arisen in favour of the petitioner on account of letter dated 18th June,

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 31 of 35
2018, issued by the respondent. The said letter was merely clarificatory in
nature and did not decide nor substantiate any rights, as the petitioner’s
earlier pending representation dated 26th October, 2010 considered by the
respondent-NDMC pursuant to the directions issued by Division Bench of
this Court, already stood rejected by way of letter dated 21st December,

2011. The respondent by way of the said letter only provided the status in
      relation to the subject shop to the petitioner.
2012. The Supreme Court has categorically laid down that every
      representation to the Government for relief may not be replied on merits.
      The representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by
      limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the
      merits of the claim. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of C. Jacob Versus
      Director of Geology and Mining and Another, (2008) 10 SCC 115, while
      holding that a reply to a dead claim cannot raise a fresh cause of action, has
      held as under:
      “xxx xxx xxx
2013. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is
      terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the
      termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he
      decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such
      challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of
      delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground
      of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court).
      Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a
      representation requesting that he may be taken back to service.
      Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such
      representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this
      position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before
      the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to
      consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High
      Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions
      (many a time even without notice to the other side), without
      examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 32 of 35
dispose of the representation.

9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every
   citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they
   assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the
   representation does not involve any decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction toconsider’. If the representation is considered and
   rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with
   reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating
   the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of
   action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of
   representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the
   representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain
   such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the
   representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and
   grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets
   obliterated or ignored.
10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be
    replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have
    become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that
    ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard
    to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be
    only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or
    to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with
    incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant
    particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a
    fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
    xxx xxx xxx”
    (Emphasis Supplied)
11. There is another aspect of the matter. This Court notes that the
    petitioner had filed a writ petition in the year 2015 seeking the same prayer
    for regularization of the shop in question in his name, and for setting aside
    the letter dated 21st December, 2011, rejecting the representation of the
    petitioner. The said writ petition, being W.P.(C) 4863/2015, titled as “Ubaid
    Versus New Delhi Municipal Council” was withdrawn on the first date

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 33 of 35
itself, as recorded in the order dated 18th May, 2015.

41. Thus, it is apparent that the earlier writ petition filed in the year 2015
    was withdrawn by the petitioner simpliciter, without any liberty to file a
    fresh petition. In this regard, it would be fruitful to refer to the judgment of
    the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service Versus State
    Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 5,
    wherein, the Supreme Court held that once a writ petition filed under Article
    226 of the Constitution of India has been withdrawn, without permission to
    file a fresh writ petition, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of
    India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect
    of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition, when he withdraws it
    without such permission. Thus, it was held as follows:
    “xxx xxx xxx
42. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after
    withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under
    Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to
    institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High
    Court under that article. On this point the decision in Daryao
    case [AIR 1961 SC 1457: (1962) 1 SCR 574] is of no assistance. But
    we are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII
    of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of
    justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground
    of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above.
    It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in benchhunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a
    case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of
    the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again.
    While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without
    permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies
    like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
    since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy
    under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be deemed to
    have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of
    action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without
    such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 34 of 35
holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in
respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition had
been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We,
however, make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may
not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the
personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the
issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the
fundamental rignt guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We,
however leave this question open.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)

42. Accordingly, considering the aforesaid judgment, the present writ
    petition, would not be maintainable on account thereof, also.
43. This Court rejects the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the
    respondent has acted in contravention to the legal opinion of the Standing
    Counsel, Special Counsel and Law Department. Mere legal opinions are not
    binding upon an authority, and are merely tools to aid the authority for
    arriving at a decision or conclusion. (See: J.S. Arora Versus D.V.C. and
    Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 173, Para 45)
44. Furthermore, the petitioner cannot place reliance on the file noting of
    the respondent, as the same cannot amount to any form of decision that was
    taken by the respondent (See: State of Uttaranchal and Another Versus
    Sunil Kumar Vaish and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 670, Para 24).
45. As far as the petitioner’s claim for parity with similarly placed
    persons in relation to the policy of the respondent, this Court accepts the
    submission of the respondent that the petitioner is not at par with the said
    persons. The policy of the respondent allowed for regularization of the shops
    of such persons, against whom the proceedings of eviction were initiated.
    However, the case of the petitioner, through its predecessor-in-interest, falls
    short of the said condition, as the eviction proceedings in the present case

W.P.(C) 12156/2018 Page 35 of 35
had attained finality. Furthermore, reliance by the petitioner on the order
dated 23rd April, 2025, in W.P.(C) 5657/2024, titled as “Rajiv Kohli Versus
New Delhi Municipal Council”, to claim parity is again misplaced. In the
said case, there was no proceeding of eviction initiated against the petitioner
therein, and the said case merely pertained to question of renewal of
License.

46. Thus, in view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, the petitioner
    has failed to make out a case for regularization and issuance of license in its
    favour for the subject shop. No merit is found in the case of the petitioner.
47. Accordingly, present writ petition, along with the pending
    applications, is dismissed.
    MINI PUSHKARNA
    (JUDGE)
    AUGUST 22, 2025
    Ak/Au /Kr/Sk